able to study the quoted passages in their original contexts. Furthermore, White should have checked his own translations against the "official" translations; this would have helped him avoid a number of errors and mistakes. White, for example, translates a passage of US (p. 212) as follows: "In the sequence of succession, the now (der Jetzt) as the element of parametric time is never a now open as facing another now" (p. 61). In view of the fact that the word Jetzt obviously is neutral, the translations should have read: "In the sequence of succession of the nows taken as elements of parametric time there is never a now that is open with respect to another." Be-wegen is not motion or movement, but "to send on the way," or "to provide with roads or ways." In Heidegger, Vernehmen is not perception and the corresponding verb means "to learn, to become aware of, to accept." In view of Nietzsche II (p. 344), Wesen cannot be translated by "essence." Welten cannot be translated by "worldhood" (= Weltlichkeit). Darstellen should not be translated by "to represent." Götliches nähert den Gott means "The divine brings God near," not "The divine supports God" (nähert from nähern, not from nähren), etc.

I cannot recommend White's exposition of Heidegger's conception of poetic language because his interpretation is far from convincing and leaves too many important issues unresolved. I have been unable to find a clear and convincing answer for the following questions: In Heidegger, precisely what is meant by Being itself (Sein)? What are the implications of the dual ontological difference for Heidegger's conception of language? Precisely how does Being itself relate to truth, language, world, and the Fourfold? In what sense can one legitimately claim that language itself speaks? How do the answers to these questions bear on Heidegger's conception of poetic language?

I do not understand why White did not make more extensive use of Heidegger's Letter on Humanism and On Time and Being, where some of the problems with which he grapples seem to have been resolved in principle. Also, the author claims explicitly that he has high esteem for the commentaries by Pöggeler and Richardson. It seems to me that his interpretation would have gained much in depth from a careful use of these invaluable commentaries.

Joseph J. Kockelmans

A PERCEPTION-ORIENTED THEORY OF METRE, by Reuven Tsur. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1977. iv + 244 pp. $7.00.

Meter has generated a good deal of scholarship in the last fifteen years. In A Perception-Oriented Theory of Metre, Reuven Tsur attempts to fuse and transcend much of this material, particularly Halle and Keyser's English Stress (1971) and the numerous rebuttals and revisions of it, by means of theories from Gestalt psychology and information processing. In combining theories of perception and theories of meter, Tsur analyzes levels of metrical complexity and the reader's ability to accommodate them. A line's acceptability is "not determined by its metricalness, but rather..."
by the reader's willingness or ability to render it *rhythmic*” (p. 28). Tsur's focus is a departure from Halle and Keyser's approach, which attempts to describe the rules which distinguishmetrical and unmetrical lines.

Like previous metrists, Tsur is concerned mainly with the iambic pentameter line, though he does discuss trochaic and ternary meters and even larger units, such as stanzas. He accepts Halle and Keyser's description of the abstract pattern of iambic pentameter, justifying the pattern by the mind's tendency to simplify complex material. Tsur asserts that this tendency leads the reader of poetry to forget deviant stresses and remember the abstract metrical pattern, the "rhythmic residue" of a series of lines (p. 123). He generally accepts the correspondence rules of Halle and Keyser, but only with modification and commentary. In Tsur's theory, the paradigmatic line contains fully stressed syllables "only and in all strong positions" (p. 4); it is extent of deviation from the paradigm which determines the character of a line of poetry. To elaborate: a stressed syllable "confirms metre in a strong position . . . [and] is *infirming* in a weak position . . . . A confirming stress that immediately follows an infirming stress *compensates* for it" (p. 4). Tsur retains Halle and Keyser's definition of stress maximum, with this qualification: a stress maximum in a weak position violates meter, but is not necessarily unmetrical; there may be a compensation.

Another departure from previous theories is Tsur's concern with units larger than the foot, which traditional metrists treat, and smaller than the line, which is Halle and Keyser's focus. It is Tsur's interest in the interaction of the linguistic dimension and the abstract metrical pattern which leads him to argue that most lines break down into segments through caesura and sometimes into smaller units, which he calls groups. This analysis of groups is perhaps the most innovative aspect of his theory. Tsur asserts that because an infirming stress psychologically requires a compensation to reconfirm meter, and the compensating stress relieves the suspense created by the infirming stress, they are "felt to be grouped more emphatically together than regularly recurring beats" (pp. 4-5). The group which most interests Tsur is the stress valley, the pattern */vo/*. Though a stress valley is a deviation from the paradigmatic line, because it is symmetrical, it occupies less space in the reader's mind than a random irregular pattern. The stress valley is Tsur's means of explaining some occurrences of stress maxima in weak positions. Tsur maintains that the majority of stress maxima in weak positions occur in position 7, the reason being that a departure from the metrical pattern near the end of the line followed by a confirmation leads to a strong sense of closure. The violation of meter often occurs as part of a stress valley, and the relief the reader feels from the reassertion of metrical pattern compensates for the violation.

Another potentially useful aspect of Tsur's theory is his distinction between convergent and divergent styles of poetry, based on the psychology of perception. Convergent style is characterized by clear contrasts and strong shapes, producing an atmosphere of certainty. Tsur describes Pope's poetry as convergent. Divergent style has blurred contrasts and weak shapes, leading to an atmosphere of uncertainty; Shelley's poetry is divergent. This distinction between the styles of Pope and Shelley is
not original, but to make the contrasts concrete Tsur outlines specific variables such as placement of caesura or enjambment of lines (p. 14). He argues, for instance, that end-stopped lines are more natural because they have a stronger shape than enjambed lines, and thus frequent enjambment may be a mark of divergent style (pp. 12-14, 183, 233). The greater the number of marked (less natural) features, the more divergent the style. But Tsur’s evidence that certain features are more or less natural is not as substantial as it might be; and his description of convergent style as “rational” and divergent style as “emotional” (p. 12) needs more extensive testing.

There are other problems in the evidence Tsur presents for his arguments. He depends largely on previous theories and studies which were not intended to test his theory. The result is some inconsistency. For instance, Halle and Keyser’s theory, which is the foundation of Tsur’s argument, more or less eliminates the concept of the foot and replaces it with the abstract pattern of the line. Yet Tsur argues that a rhythmical performance requires awareness of feet as metrical units (p. 16). Considering that other metrists have argued that the foot is simply a convention for analyzing meter and not a linguistic unit, Tsur must offer much more support for his treatment of the foot as though it were perceived. Similarly, in many cases Tsur bases his assertions about the effects of particular lines on the reactions of hypothetical readers, not real ones (see pp. 50 and 137, for example). To strengthen his theory, he must show that readers really perceive the patterns he describes.

Another problem weakening the argument is the structure of the book. While Tsur’s presentation of a condensed form of his theory in an introductory synopsis is quite useful, especially for those who would apply it, the rationale for the order of the main text is not clear; a chapter on caesura is followed by a chapter on trochaic and ternary meters with no intervening transition, and the important concept of stress valley is treated in parts of two chapters, rather than in one. The result is that the chapters do not merge into a unified whole. If the main text had duplicated and expanded the structure of the synopsis, the argument would have been clearer. While the problems with evidence and organization prevent Tsur’s theory from being fully convincing, his application of theories of perception to the study of meter, and especially his focus on the reader, is potentially useful for the study of poetic style.

Beth Packert-Hall


In A Defence of Poetry Shelley speaks of “the vanity of translation”: “... it were as wise to cast a violet into a crucible that you might discover the formal principle of its colour and odour, as seek to transfuse from one language into another the creations of a poet.” Why was it then that he dared to translate, often with striking