ARTICLE

“The Whole Content of My Being Shrieks in Contradiction against Itself”: Uncanny Selves in Sayed Kashua and Philip Roth*

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ABSTRACT

The proliferation of doppelgängers and other doubles in Sayed Kashua’s Second Person Singular (2010) and Philip Roth’s Operation Shylock: A Confession (1993) suggests that the demands and expectations of national identity threaten the subjectivity of those who try to resist it. In both novels, paranoia and the abject unsettle the boundaries of subjectivity and contribute to the disequilibrium of the mind and the fragmentation of the body. Damaged bodies signify the disintegrating selves of characters who try in vain to overcome the limitations imposed on them by ideological paradigms of identity itself; paranoia is the psychological expression of the seemingly stable “I.” Paranoia and abjection—simultaneously the reason for and the consequence of the doublings and splits in these novels—indicate identity’s encroachment on subjectivity. As such, these novels, though divergent in some aspects of their confrontation with identity, invoke similar phenomena to mount a scathing critique of nationalist logic.

Keywords: Roth, Kashua, doppelgängers, uncanny, paranoia, abjection, fragmentation, doubling

A CORPOREAL DISCOURSE OF SUBJECTIVITY

Though the centrality of doubles in Philip Roth’s novel Operation Shylock: A Confession (1993) has been convincingly attributed to the author’s
affinity to Dostoyevsky, Shakespeare is no less a literary interlocutor for Roth. The enduring legacy of *The Merchant of Venice* is the Jew Shylock, who casts his giant shadow over the novel and its characters: “the savage, repellant, and villainous Jew, deformed by hatred and revenge, [who] entered as our doppelgänger into the consciousness of the enlightened West.” A dark double whose vileness is inscribed in the deformity of his body itself, Shylock has for centuries embodied “the Jew,” a singular figure taken by Christian Europe to articulate Jews as a collective.

The characters in Sayed Kashua’s novel *Guf sheni yahid* (2010)—published in English as *Second Person Singular* in 2012—have their own doppelgängers to contend with, figures specific to their own political and historical context. Despite their differences from Roth’s characters, though, their doubleness, too, is distinctly embodied. Kashua’s title designates first and foremost a pronoun that indicates perspective (you are not me) and also number (you are one and not more). While English uses “person” to designate pronouns, Hebrew uses “body,” *guf*, which underscores a physical component of the grammatical and points to the corporeality of identity with which the narrative is so concerned. This emphasis on the body finds ample expression in the novel’s plot. For example, when an Arab character in the novel feels fascination and discomfort at a photography exhibit because he cannot distinguish the Arabs from the Jews in the photographs—something that he was proud of being able to do—he points to his own perceived mastery of the rules of identity and to his disorientation when those rules are transgressed.

The physical, corporeal manifestation of the struggle with and against identity is a preoccupation for both authors more broadly. In a 2010 *Haaretz* column titled “Kashua’s Complaint,” Kashua describes the terrible bout of constipation he suffers upon reading the new Hebrew translation of Roth’s *Portnoy’s Complaint*: “When I get into a book that I admire, I really get into it.” Speaking that evening on a panel about the future of Jerusalem, he is struck by so much pain that—right in the middle of a discussion of the sewer systems in Arab communities—he starts crying and says, “I can’t go on.” Much to his astonishment, the audience rewards his tears with a standing ovation, having misconstrued his physical pain as emotional pain.
for the suffering of the disenfranchised Palestinian Israelis. The affliction that Kashua experiences—and the misunderstanding it occasions—is not his only connection to Philip Roth. Sardonic and self-deprecating, both authors have complicated relationships with their own people. Kashua faces the ire of both Arabs and Jews with each text he publishes and, like Roth, has earned the most scathing criticism from his own people, who worry that he confirms stereotypes. Kashua’s *Vayehi boker* (*Let It Be Morning*, 2004) offers a surrealistic potential narrative that touches on Roth’s preoccupations in the alternative history novel *The Plot against America* (2004).

*Second Person Singular* moves more decidedly into Rothian territory. In it, a Palestinian Israeli gradually usurps the identity of a vegetative Israeli Jew, ultimately attending his Arab past self’s own funeral. In its reorientation of the protagonist’s “passing” from the present progressive to the past tense, the novel evokes Roth’s *Human Stain* (2000), about a black man’s lifelong passing as a white Jew, yet its more compelling novelistic twin is Roth’s *Operation Shylock*. In both texts, the presence of doppelgängers shatters any sense of the body as a reliable indicator of identity. Both novels grapple with the question of subjectivity born of and against minority subject positions. Both call on the uncanny to depict the formation and the limitations of this subjectivity. Both locate the body as the primary nexus of these processes.

Reading *Second Person Singular* side by side with *Operation Shylock* exposes a shared preoccupation with the formation, maintenance, and destabilization of subjectivity. More specifically, both novels invoke paranoia and abjection to represent a disruption of the borders and the stability of integrated subjectivity. Paranoia and abjection both contribute to disequilibrium or fragmentation—the former of the mind, the latter of the body. It is this destabilization that is served by the multiple doublings in these novels. The double is necessarily related to a damaged corporeality that parallels and physicalizes the disintegrating self from which the protagonist tries, in vain, to flee. Paranoia becomes the counterpart of the physical self that seems stable but that relies on a damaged body for the sustenance of its own false subjectivity. The damaged double appears as a vehicle for a secure political identity, allowing the “original” Arab to become an Ashkenazi Jew and the “original” American Jew to become a
Zionist. In addition to these primary doppelgängers, the novels evoke the uncanny through a broader doubling that encompasses other characters, events, and ideologies. Both texts’ preoccupation with death and its performance can be understood in this context.

The slippage between subjectivity and its politicized counterpart, identity, suggests that the doubling and fragmentation in these novels designate identity as a pathology. As such, the novels offer a critique of ideology, against not only the exclusionary logic of the nation but also the delineated boundaries of the mirrored identities of Palestinian Israelis and American Jews. This is not to deny the legitimacy of Palestinian and Jewish American identities and their importance within broader political, historical, and ethical paradigms. Rather, the point is that Kashua and Roth both identify an alternate mode of being, defiantly disentangled from collective and nationalist concerns. Although there is unarguably something liberating in this disentanglement, these novels do not celebrate it; the loss of identity, no less than its demands, contributes to the characters’ agitation. Both authors present the concept of identity itself as encroaching on subjectivity by promising an impossible wholeness.

Reading Kashua’s novel in tandem with Roth’s frames their characters’ dilemmas within a broader political discourse of minority identity in which Jewishness is not the basis of comparison, exposing similarities in the experiences of non-Israeli Jews and non-Jewish Israelis. Taken to an extreme, such a reading risks erasing the specific challenges and distinctive circumstances of Palestinian citizens of Israel. This is by no means my intent. Rather, comparing these novels can underscore their shared sense of the limitations of collective identity and the distressing dearth of feasible alternatives.

DOPPELGÄNGERS: DAMAGED BODIES, SPLINTERED MINDS

In Roth’s *Operation Shylock*, an author named Philip Roth undergoes a harrowing experience with the sleep drug Halcion, which nearly drives him to suicide with its paranoia-inducing effects. “My mind began to
disintegrate,” he recalls. “‘Where is Philip Roth?’ I asked aloud. ‘Where did he go?’ I was not speaking histrionically. I asked because I wanted to know.” Several months after his recovery from the experience he characterizes as a “deformation,” he discovers that someone is using his name and impersonating him in Jerusalem to promote a movement called Diasporism, which advocates for the return of all European Jews in Israel to their European countries of origin. Troubled by the identity theft and somewhat intrigued by what seems to him a ridiculous ideology, Philip (the narrator) travels to Jerusalem, ostensibly to interview the novelist Aharon Appelfeld but also to confront his impostor. Distraught to discover that the impostor, a man dying of terminal cancer whom he nicknames Pipik, looks exactly like him, he is determined to expose him as a fraud but gets caught up in paranoia that encompasses the Holocaust, the Mossad, the Intifada, the occupation, and more. The novel, subtitled “A Confession,” begins with a short preface claiming that it is based on “actual occurrences” and ends with a “Note to the Reader” that impishly announces, “This book is a work of fiction. . . . This confession is false.”

Kashua’s *Second Person Singular* tells two stories that eventually intersect. The first is of a wealthy, successful, nameless lawyer who is desperate to assimilate into Israeli society by defying stereotypes about Arabs, even as he succumbs to the stereotypical expectations of his society. When he discovers a love note that he believes his wife has written to another man, his life is turned upside down, and he becomes increasingly paranoid. The second story is about a young man, Amir, who has escaped a stifling life in his village and lives in near invisibility as a social-work student in Jerusalem. After getting a job caring for Yonatan, a Jewish Israeli man his own age, Amir slowly begins to usurp Yonatan’s identity, first in secret and later with the blessing of the young man’s mother. Finally, after he oversees the burial of Yonatan under Amir’s name, he adopts Yonatan’s Ashkenazi Jewish identity entirely. The narratives intersect when the lawyer, having meticulously investigated the note and his wife’s claims of innocence, confronts Amir, who had known her years earlier. Though Amir’s version of the story corroborates his wife’s innocence, the novel’s end suggests but does not confirm that his paranoia may be legitimate.
Both *Operation Shylock* and *Second Person Singular* situate Jerusalem as the site of their characters’ struggles with self—as a place that is definitively uncanny for being simultaneously familiar and foreign for Roth’s and Kashua’s characters, both Jews and Arabs. As such, Jerusalem is the ideal locus for doubling, destabilization, and disintegration.

The doppelgänger, as outlined by Freud in his essay on the uncanny, “was originally an insurance against the extinction of the self” and later became “the uncanny harbinger of death.” He is someone “who may identify himself with another and so become unsure of his true self; or he may substitute the other’s self for his own. The self may thus be duplicated, divided and interchanged.”7 Two paradigms emerge: the double who duplicates and the double who divides; both threaten the integrity of the self. Gry Faurholt elaborates on these two types of doubles and suggests that they signify “distinct perspectives on the theme of identity in crisis.” The duplicating double is “the alter ego or identical double of a protagonist who seems to be either a victim of an identity theft perpetrated by a mimicking supernatural presence or subject to a paranoid hallucination,” while the dividing double represents “the split personality or dark half of the protagonist, an unleashed monster that acts as a physical manifestation of a dissociated part of the self.”8 She interprets duplication as a function of the Lacanian mirror stage, in which the infant’s identification with an external image is necessary for the development of the ego. By contrast, she links division to the Freudian Oedipal stage, which involves the renunciation or “othering” of the socially unacceptable sides of the self.9

I have some qualms about the attempt to separate the two types this decisively; in these two novels, there is a necessary overlap between them. However, it is clear that there is more at stake in these doubles than simply the return of repressed material or the eruption of hidden selves, as so many doppelgänger narratives have been characterized. Anticipating such a reading, Philip explicitly asserts that Pipik is “not the other me, the second me, the irresponsible me, the deviant me, the opposing me, the delinquent, turpitudinous me embodying the evil fantasies of myself.”10 Robert Alter agrees, noting that Pipik has little in common with his
nineteenth-century literary forebears and reading the second Philip Roth as “an ideological extrapolation, rather than a psychological excavation, of the first.” The emergence, exposure, or creation of the double points not necessarily or not only to repressed desires but also to other modes of understanding, identification, or disidentification with the (nonrepressed) self.

As Faurholt notes, this process of self-identification is a function of socialization. In the case of two novels dealing with political marginalization and ambivalence or indifference to nationalism, the flashpoint is ideological. Coming to terms with one’s double entails understanding one’s place outside the familiar categories of identity—in effect, resisting the demands of socialization within highly ideological social constructs in order to maintain a semblance of subjective integrity. If there is something subversive about this engagement with identity, it is that it involves bypassing conventional categories of identity altogether.

Before I look more closely at the primary doppelgängers in these novels, I want to consider the two concepts from which I will draw to theorize them: paranoia and abjection. Among the most influential psychoanalytical interpretations of paranoia is that articulated by Melanie Klein. For her, infantile expulsion and integration of various fragments of the other from which the subject seeks to differentiate herself are part of the process of the formation of subjectivity. Those who cannot achieve this integration remain mired in a state of anxiety; paranoia becomes a defense mechanism that functions to ward off the very depression that Klein sees as the subsequent position in the formation of an integrated subjectivity, wherein the infant comes to relate to whole objects.

Paranoia, then, speaks to the relation of the inside and the outside—external forces with which the self must engage in order to achieve coherence. This inside-outside relation is psychic in paranoia and finds physiological expression in abjection. In her study of Klein, Julia Kristeva links Klein’s notion of paranoia explicitly to abjection: “If the future subject readily grants himself a ‘presence’ of other people that he internalizes as much as it expels, he is not facing an object but, in fact, an ab-ject.”
Abjection is “what disturbs identity, system, order.”\textsuperscript{15} In \textit{Powers of Horror}, Kristeva returns to a fundamental concern of psychoanalytic thought: the constitution of a distinctly delineated subjectivity. Abjection entails the necessity of renouncing a part of one’s self—as the infant must renounce the mother’s body, which is still a part of its own—in order to maintain the self. Kristeva associates the abject with bodily waste, vomit, and other phenomena that are both necessary and repugnant: “Such wastes drop so that I might live.”\textsuperscript{16} That which the body renounces or expels, however, never disappears but continues to hover on the verge of consciousness, necessarily recurring.

Noëlle McAfee clarifies the relation of the physical, corporeal process of abjection to the formation of subjectivity: “As a process, expelling what is deemed ‘other’ to ‘oneself,’ it is a means for defining the borders of subjectivity. But, as a phenomenon that never entirely recedes, abjection also haunts subjectivity, threatening to unravel what has been constructed; one’s own sense of self is never settled and unshaken. To keep hold of ‘oneself,’ a subject has to remain vigilant against what may undermine its borders.”\textsuperscript{17} The process of expulsion can never establish unbreachable borders; the self is, by definition, unstable.

In literary texts, the representation of such unstable subjectivities has often been addressed through the performance of stability, through devices such as doubles, masks, and passing. These devices have been attended to by critics of both Roth and Kashua, almost always in terms of the conflicted minority identities of American Jews and Palestinian Israelis, respectively.\textsuperscript{18} Gil Hochberg suggests that Kashua’s works resist the prevailing discourse of “the Israeli Arab as a failed subject and impossible identity,” a paradigm that promotes “separatist ideologies . . . in order to sustain the illusion of authentic and coherent (Israeli or Palestinian) national identities.”\textsuperscript{19} Kashua’s representation of the Israeli Arab, she argues, helps “to envision new possibilities of being that are articulated beyond and across current (and prevailing) ethno-national political maps.”\textsuperscript{20} Yet even these new possibilities of being are trapped within the framework of minority/majority and Jewish/Arab; they remain possibilities of being ideological or political entities.
The shift I identify in *Second Person Singular* may well be a function of a shift on the part of Kashua himself away from the constricting binaries and even those spaces in between them, to which Hochberg points. This development not only offers an escape from the arena of identity but also brings Kashua closer to Roth, whose preoccupation with a more personal, more fundamental notion of subjectivity precedes his engagement with the political predicaments of identity. For Roth, playing with identity is a strategy for coping with challenges specific to Jewishness, such as questions of homeland and diaspora and of belonging to or disengagement from a Jewish collective. At the same time, identity is a function of the human condition, allowing for invention and evasion, both serious and mischievous. In other words, the question for Roth as for Kashua is not only “what am I?” but has become, simply, “am I?” I want to suggest that in these particular novels, the key is not identity but rather the way identity usurps subjectivity—the hijacking of the self by ideology.

Both novels highlight the aggressions and the violence imposed by notions of identity; exposing identity as a pathology, they reject it and attempt to salvage subjectivity. To this end, multiple doubles populate these two novels, but I begin with the most immediately apparent ones: Philip and Pipik in Roth’s novel and Yonatan and Amir in Kashua’s. These pairs not only encompass both types of doppelgänger but also are shadowed and complemented by other, more subtle doublings. In *Operation Shylock*, Pipik looks exactly like Philip—even his clothes are identical, down to the same missing jacket button and loose threads—and claims that he, too, is named Philip Roth. When Philip sees Pipik’s passport, Philip is certain that the photo is of him, but Pipik quietly explains that it is not: it is Pipik before the cancer began to consume him. Nevertheless, he insists that he is a distinct, utterly autonomous person. A weightlifting military man who worked as a private investigator and bodyguard, he is decisively not the bookish intellectual Philip: “I AM THE YOU THAT IS NOT WORDS,” he asserts. But Philip won’t have it. He contrasts Pipik’s usurpation of his identity with the Israeli author and Holocaust survivor Aharon Appelfeld, whose friendship with Roth represents their “distinctly radical twoness,” in which they both “embody the reverse of the
other’s experience; because each recognizes in the other the Jewish man he is not; . . . because [they] are the heirs jointly of a drastically bifurcated legacy.”22 It is clear that this bifurcation stabilizes Philip’s sense of self; Pipik’s duplication, on the other hand, unsettles it. This is why Philip refuses to call him a double and why he assigns him a separate subjectivity as the ridiculous Pipik: “To think of him as a double was to bestow on him the destructive status of a famously real and prestigious archetype. . . . Yes, name him now! Because aptly naming him is knowing him for what he is and isn’t, exorcising and possessing him all at once.”23 Resisting Pipik not only means asserting his own subjectivity as the author Philip Roth, it also means refusing to participate in the debate between Zionism and Diasporism. While Pipik is a prominent representative of the latter, Philip declines to define himself on the basis of these two paradigms of Jewish identity. His assertion of an autonomous subjectivity is a matter of personal identity, and more importantly, it entails the rejection of ideology as the defining factor of who one is.

In Kashua’s novel, Amir begins working as the caretaker of the Israeli Yonatan, who is in a vegetative state. To pass long, boring nights in the attic room alone with the inert man, who looks uncannily like him, Amir begins reading his books, listening to his music, and slowly acquiring his tastes, finally even taking up Yonatan’s interest in photography. He applies to the prestigious Bezalel Art Academy in Yonatan’s name (in a sort of reverse affirmative action), completes his degree with flying colors, and finally—after Yonatan’s death and with the encouragement of Yonatan’s mother, Ruchaleh, who has become his own adopted mother—assumes his identity altogether. In Amir’s case, merging with Yonatan means discarding his own self; the duplication is finally a replacement of one subjectivity with another and therefore entails a sacrifice, but it is one he is willing to make.

The lawyer is the character in Second Person Singular who provides the distinctly radical twoness that Philip cites in Appelfeld.24 Though he has no real ideological sentiment, the lawyer feels forever inadequate in Israeli society, and he reluctantly plays by its rules to feel self-worth as a “successful Arab”: he reads critically acclaimed books that bore him, has the
conversations that educated Israeli Palestinians are supposed to have, and eats sushi. The characteristics he adopts, though not particularly Jewish or Israeli, correspond to the broader Israeli effort to identify with the trends of the cosmopolitan West. The lawyer has to abide by the expectations of other Israeli Palestinians—which themselves are constructed in response to the hegemonic Ashkenazi Jewish Israeli culture—regarding his car, his neighborhood, his political beliefs, and his children’s education. He subscribes to the hierarchy of “immigrants” and “locals” that divides and categorizes Israeli Palestinians living in Jerusalem. He is the Arab that Amir is not.

The sensitive Amir, traumatized by the mockery and rejection he faced as a boy, has experienced the hypocrisy and the hollowness of the Israeli Palestinians who tout solidarity with family, village, and nation, as well as of liberal Israeli Jews who claim to believe in peace and coexistence while subscribing to the worst stereotypes about Arabs. Unlike the lawyer, who becomes the very stereotype he rejects when he thinks he has caught his wife in an affair, Amir is utterly unbound to the standard tropes that shape the discourse of Israelis and Palestinians.²⁵ He simply bows out. His theft of Yonatan’s identity is not so much passing as it is escaping—adapting the only self that allows him to rise above the fray of identity altogether. It is worth noting that although Amir sees Yonatan’s Ashkenazi ethnicity as a “nonidentity” that allows him to safely evade the identity politics that has haunted him, his experience as Yonatan demonstrates that the Ashkenazi Jewish identity in Israel contains its own defining tensions. The enlightened tolerance of the privileged students at Bezalel, for example, clashes with their casual racism. Even though Amir hopes that being Ashkenazi will make him invisible, the reality makes it difficult for him to avoid identity as a concept.

Debra Shostak’s observation that Operation Shylock “externalizes and dramatizes the self-dividedness of the Jew” also applies to the representation of the Israeli Palestinian in Second Person Singular, which, like Roth’s novel, depicts duplications and divisions that are manifested both psychologically and physically.²⁶ Both novels’ doublings are informed by a profoundly experienced paranoia. Freud, Kristeva, Jacques Lacan, Klein, and others have
offered diverse explications of paranoia. For Freud, paranoia emerges from repressed homosexuality. For Lacan, it speaks to the possibility to experience other perspectives and alternate versions of reality. For Kristeva, it relates to abjection. For Klein, it is a necessary part of the development of the self, which can lead to disintegration in some cases. Fundamentally, then, paranoia refers to a split that ultimately contributes either to the coherent integration of subjectivity or to its further fragmentation.

In Roth’s novel, everyone is paranoid, every motive questioned. Philip nearly dies because of “the disaster of self-abandonment” brought about by his Halcion breakdown; after his recovery, he spends most of the novel guessing the true intentions of everyone he encounters. It is Pipik, however, who evokes the greatest sense of psychic disequilibrium, and Philip articulates it explicitly in terms of a split. After their first encounter, he becomes convinced that Pipik is “a specter created out of my fear of mentally coming apart while abroad and on my own for the first time since recovering—a nightmare about the return of a usurping self altogether beyond my control.” Such self-questioning exposes the split self; this, more than suspicion of others, is the hallmark of paranoia. Soon enough, Philip realizes that Pipik is real, “a me who is not even me to obsess me day and night.” This recognition does little to assuage “the all-out paranoid” he has become and “the octopus of paranoia” that engulfs him and his imposter. Ultimately, Pipik’s existence incites him to agree to participate in an intelligence operation for the Mossad; the Zionist cause gives him the excuse to impersonate his impersonator. The conflict between Pipik and Philip pits a Jewish identity against a more universal human self, and Philip seems to succumb to the rules of the game, assuming an alternative Jewish identity. The end of the novel, however, reveals this act of ideological allegiance to have been false. Finally, only Philip’s authorial authority allows him to overcome the paranoia that threatens him, to take control of the ideological commitment (for/against Zionism) that Pipik’s existence forces on him, and to reassert his independent subjectivity.

In Second Person Singular, Amir is certain that Yonatan is playing games with him and, later, plotting against him. But it is the lawyer for whom paranoia becomes a defining trait: when he finds a love note in his wife’s
handwriting, his rational faculties disappear instantly, replaced by homicidal rage and a suspicion that his son is not actually his. Though he calms down, his paranoia, “this uncontrollable feeling” that threatens to ruin his life, persists to the end of the novel.\(^{31}\) Significantly, the onset of paranoia is informed by his rejection of the enlightened beliefs about women’s rights—explicitly identified with Jewish Israeli society—that he has superficially championed before, as well as with his own rejection of those “primitive” Arab ideas about honor. In other words, the moment he becomes the Arab he has rejected and rejects the Jew he has aspired to be (his only two options, as he understands it), he experiences psychological disintegration. As the Arab whom Amir is not, the paranoid lawyer gives us a sense of the Arab whom Amir could have been. Like Roth, Kashua invokes his authority at the novel’s end. He does so, however, not to resolve the lawyer’s paranoia and reinstate his subjective integrity but rather to intensify the ambiguity that led to this dissolution in the first place.

In both novels, psychological disintegration is coupled with damaged bodies. Pipik suffers from a brutal terminal cancer. Shostak argues that Pipik’s illness signifies both the “fear of self-annihilation and a symbolic displacement of the desire to murder the self Philip hates.”\(^{32}\) Though the fear of self-annihilation overshadows the novel as a whole, it is not necessarily conceptualized as self-hatred. Furthermore, Philip is consistent in the novel in his insistence that, despite outward appearances, he and Pipik are not the same. Roth’s depiction of the effects of the cancer points more to its itemization of the body as a collection of parts vulnerable to disintegration than to murder. Pipik’s cancer has necessitated multiple operations, among them a penile implant. Philip makes clear that Pipik’s bodily lack—the one he tried to impose on him by calling him Pipik—is inversely proportional to his own integrated subjectivity: “That man is not me! I am here and I am whole!”\(^{33}\) Indeed, coming apart—grotesquely externalized not only by Pipik’s existence but also by his cancer’s theft of fragments of his body—poses the greatest threat: “I was all at once terrified that I did not have the strength to hold myself together very much longer and that I would be carried into some new nightmare of disintegration unless I could forcibly stop this unraveling.”\(^{34}\) Failing to
gather the strength necessary to hold himself together would bring him to the brink of suicide, to his “denuded self and its clamorous longing for self-obliteration.”

In Kashua’s novel, Yonatan’s failed suicide attempt—the desire to extinguish his subjectivity—results in his absolute lack of control over his body and his utter dependence on others for his upkeep, hygiene, and survival. Exposing the odd incongruity between the inside of the body and its outside, Amir observes that, despite its vegetative state, Yonatan’s body is “surprisingly robust and athletic.” This disjuncture between the inside and outside of the body is present in Pipik as well: the absurdly ample penis that he brandishes as proof of his authenticity is artificial and belies the cancer consuming him from within. Both of these characters’ conditions require others to negotiate the borders of their bodies: to interact with them, with their physical processes, and with the fluids they excrete. These excretions, overflowing the body’s boundaries, are one manifestation of what Kristeva calls the abject: everything that “disturbs identity, system, order” and thereby underlines the fragility of the border, the body, or the law. Abjection, according to Kristeva, is “the state of abjecting or rejecting what is other to oneself—and thereby creating borders of an always tenuous ‘I.’”

Pipik’s nurse and lover, the sensual Jinx Possesski, is a cancer nurse whose “transgressive, tabooless . . . hands, so deceptively clean and innocent-seeming, . . . had nonetheless been everywhere, swathing, spraying, washing, wiping, freely touching everywhere, handling everything, open wounds, drainage bags, every running orifice.” Jinx generates Philip’s sensitivity to his own corporeality. After she leaves his hotel room, he wakes up to a nauseating stench: “I smelled something enormous putrefying. I smelled must and feces. I smelled the walls of a damp old chimney. I smelled the fermenting smell of sperm. . . . I smelled of them all. The shitting [taxi] driver. The fat lawyer. Pipik. He was the smell of incense and old, dried blood. I smelled of every second of every minute of my last 24 hours. . . . Not until I decompose in my coffin will I ever be so immensely pungent again.” These smells of decay and bodily fluids signal abjection, a physical, sensory representation of a distinct subjectivity—but one that relies on proximity to death to maintain itself.
On his first night caring for Yonatan, Amir finds himself forcing food down his uncooperative throat and trying to avoid the haunting gaze of a man who is alive but not really. Suddenly, “a sharp smell filled the room. It was nothing like the unventilated, medicinal scent I had encountered when I first came up to the attic. . . . I went over to the window and opened it all the way, trying to overcome my nausea.” He realizes that Yonatan has, contrary to the expectations established by the seasoned day nurse before her departure, defecated; Amir must clean him. Over the course of two pages, Amir details his physical struggles to deal with the excrement smeared all over the bed and Yonatan’s body: cleaning him, hoisting “his uncooperative body” into a special wheelchair, washing his body, and dressing him. Amir describes the experience as a harrowing battle scene: “You have to act as though you’re under fire, I told myself. I summoned every ounce of strength I had and in the end was able to press his heavy body into the chair and tie the straps around him. . . . I’d showered him, washed his hair, and wrestled him into his new diaper and pajamas.” Later, Ruchaleh tells Amir that Yonatan was testing him, suggesting that he does still have some control over his body. Yonatan’s act is an assertion that he is indeed alive and that he is still in charge of his self.

In no time, though, Amir learns to take command; he meticulously, thoroughly, and unflinchingly cleans Yonatan, a task that has become much easier: “I would . . . wash him with liquid soap and a soft sponge, hitting spots that I don’t even touch on my own body. Lifting his head and cleaning his neck, cleaning behind his ears, in his crotch. I would even bend over and meticulously clean his bottom through the hole in the chair.” Yet the incongruity of Yonatan’s helplessness in terms of his body and his physical strength is as uncanny as his haunting stare: “Everything about this limp creature seemed so healthy.” Amir’s increasing comfort with Yonatan’s body despite this disjuncture is the first stage of his usurpation of Yonatan’s identity. Later, he says, “I felt like an extension of Yonatan.” By the end of the novel, he can assert, “I was Yonatan Forschmidt.” From Amir’s perspective, this transformation signifies his shift from a particular identity to a universal subjectivity, though he later discovers that Ashkenazi Jewishness contains its own
conflicts and complexes. Like Roth, he attempts to draw clear boundaries between the particular that plagues him and the universal that he hopes will offer him sanctuary.

Ruchaleh encourages his metamorphosis. “Man [is] only smart,” she says, “if he [is] able to shed his identity.” Furthermore, she understands this process in physiological terms: “It’s like an organ donation. Around here identity is like one of the organs of the body and yours is faulty. . . . What you have here . . . is an organ donation that could very well save your life.”47 This line of thought accords exactly with Freud’s characterization of the double’s original purpose as “a defense against annihilation.”48 But the intimate encounter with the body that it entails has a price: the other life, the one that will be annihilated, namely, the one that Amir discards when he becomes Yonatan. The bodily fluids that both nurses in these novels encounter signify a corporeal manifestation of the paranoia that marks both novels. Both abjection and paranoia transgress and disrupt the borders of subjectivity, alerting us to the fragility of integration and wholeness, whether through the body and its proximity to death or through a mind always on the verge of dissolution.

THE DOUBLE IN US ALL
Besides these primary, readily evident doublings, both novels offer an array of instances of split or doubled subjectivities, both within individuals and among them. Two factual events unfold in Jerusalem and frame Roth’s novel: the trial of John Demjanjuk, who is accused of being the notorious Ivan the Terrible, and the Intifada. Discreetly ensconced in a hotel in Arab East Jerusalem to avoid bumping into Pipik, who is staying in the western part of the city while impersonating him, Philip occasionally attends the trial. Watching the man accused of murdering almost a million Jews at Treblinka, he considers his defense: “How could I be both that and this?” For Philip, the answer is simple; where subjectivity is concerned, nothing is impossible: “Because you are. Because your appearance proves only that to be both a loving grandfather and a mass murderer is not all that difficult. . . . The Germans have proved definitively to all the world
that to maintain two radically divergent personalities, one very nice and one not so nice, is no longer the prerogative of psychopaths only.” The Demjanjuk trial has its own ghostly doubles: the trial of a Palestinian boy in an Israeli military court in Ramallah, which Philip attends with his friend, George Ziad; and the trial of Adolf Eichmann, which took place in 1960 in a still-divided Jerusalem. As a spectator in Ramallah and Jerusalem, Philip engages with the questions they raise and the Jewish identities they help forge and maintain along the spectrum of victimhood and oppression. However, as an observer, he plays no active role in these processes.

The split or doubled identity exemplified by Demjanjuk and Nazism is not solely the purview of Jekylls and Hydes. Appelfeld, a friend of Philip’s (and of Roth’s) and the subject of the interview that Philip flies to Israel to conduct, relates his postwar experience to an unstable subjectivity: “At first I tried to run away from myself and from my memories, to live a life that was not my own and to write about a life that was not my own. But a hidden feeling told me that I was not allowed to flee from myself and that if I denied the experience of my childhood in the Holocaust I would be spiritually deformed.” The admonition that Appelfeld was not allowed to flee from himself literalizes the split, while the notion of spiritual deformation offers a compelling counterpart to the corporeal manifestations of fragmentation. Appelfeld’s choice to confront the self from whom he hoped to flee is the choice that Demjanjuk never makes; Demjanjuk’s seemingly contradictory selves inhabit parallel tracks.

A final, significant example of this internal bifurcation is the Palestinian George Ziad, a friend of Philip’s from Chicago in the 1950s. On running into Ziad in Jerusalem (by chance or by design), Philip is shocked by how profoundly he has changed: “The metamorphosis that, physically, had all but effaced the boy I’d known at Chicago was nothing, I had come to realize, beside an alteration, or deformation, far more astonishing and grave. . . . [Back then, he had seemed] so wholly and impressively formed.” As with Appelfeld, the potential for deformation—realized, in Ziad—is internal. Ziad is a brilliant, exhausting man consumed by paranoia, to the point that his sweeping ideological monologues themselves enfold the rift that divides his being.
one of his diatribes, a bewildered Philip characterizes it as “overstatement and lucidity, of insight and stupidity, of precise historical data and willful historical ignorance, a loose array of observations as disjointed and as shallow as it was deep.” What makes this duality all the more compelling is that Ziad ironically points out the Zionists’ own insistence on inhabiting two impossible positions: they were “victims before they were conquerors and . . . conquerors only because they are victims.”

Ziad is keenly self-aware of his deformation: “My talent was to teach Dostoyevsky, not to live drowning in spite and resentment like the underground man! My talent was to explicate the interminable monologues of his seething madmen, not to turn into a seething madman whose own interminable monologues he cannot stifle even in his sleep. Why don’t I restrain myself if I know what I’m doing to myself?”

Though he, like Philip, depicts himself as having undergone a transformation, the deformity emerges from the uneasy coexistence of both Ziads: on the one hand, the worldly, “wholly and impressively formed” professor of literature and, on the other, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) operative. Philip’s encounter with Ziad and his obsession with “the issue of self-division” and “multiple selves” leads him to ruminate on subjectivity: “Amazing, that something as tiny, really, as a self should contain contending subselves—and that these subselves should themselves be constructed of subselves, and on and on and on. And yet, even more amazing, a grown man, an educated adult, a full professor, who seeks self-integration!” Philip clearly distinguishes his own quest for an integrated subjectivity independent of the effects of Halcion and of Pipik from Ziad’s; what he seeks, ultimately, is a reprieve from those identities that demand such integration.

In Second Person Singular, the rejection of facile nationalism is articulated by the lawyer’s protégé, Tarik, a relatively minor character. Tarik is invited to a dinner party hosted by the lawyer and his wife. There, in his polite and uncontentious manner, he proposes a radical idea that shocks the other guests. In the middle of a discussion about how Palestinian Israeli children study very little “that qualifies as Palestinian,” one woman asserts, “It can’t go on like this. We have to do something.” Tarik responds:
“Why is that? . . . I’m sorry. I don’t really know anything about this and I don’t have kids yet, but why exactly do they need to strengthen their Palestinian nationalism?”

Tarik’s question was met with silence and an edgy bewilderment.

“What do you mean, why?” Samir asked. “Because they’re Palestinians. . . . They learn the Israeli narrative, as viewed through the lens of the Zionist industry.”

“Yes, I understand that. But why respect either side of the story?”

The upshot of this conversation is that it will be difficult to find Tarik a suitable wife, given his bizarre disassociation from Palestinian nationalism. Tarik’s observation that “a tree is a tree and a man is a man” relieves him of the need to cultivate “roots,” to prune his subjectivity according to the demands of these mystical roots at the heart of “either side of the story,” the Zionist and the Palestinian, allowing him to be simply a man. The most threatening point Tarik makes is not that he sees Zionism and Palestinian nationalism as two sides of the same coin but that he questions the very logic of nationalist identity, rejecting this familiar construct as inimical to human nature itself.

Ruchaleh, who becomes Amir’s surrogate mother, expresses the same point. A member of Women in Black (Nashim beshaḥor), Ruchaleh “had nothing but scorn for tradition, nationalism, religion, roots, roots trips, and sentences like ‘He who has no past, has no future’”—a sentence that Tarik also rejects. She sees nationalism as an amateurish attempt at masquerade, in which “the Arabs did a bad job of impersonating the Zionists, who did a bad job of impersonating the European nationalists of the early twentieth century. Nor did she believe in identity, certainly not the local nationalistic version of it.” Ruchaleh’s thinking echoes that of Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi (like her, a member of the Jerusalem intelligentsia), who has written that the “Zionist dream of transforming the Jewish self into something utterly other may have been the greatest act of impersonation in modern Jewish history,” but it unhesitatingly implicates the Palestinians in the same kind of performance.
Operation Shylock, too, conceptualizes Zionism and Palestinian nationalism as reflections of each other. Its characters’ allegiances are unclear: in different parts of the novel, Philip suspects both Pipik and Ziad of being agents or double agents for or against the Israelis or the Palestinians. Philip himself claims to have been forced to make this choice as a Jew by agreeing to participate in a Mossad mission code-named Operation Shylock to expose Jews aiding the PLO—only to deny everything at the novel’s end. Ziad’s nationalism makes him an unlikely bedfellow of Pipik, champion of Diasporism and counterpart of Theodor Herzl. Diasporism, a doctrine that inverts Zionism and takes to their logical extreme various theories equating Jewishness and diaspora, is predicated upon the familiar opposition of, in DeKoven Ezrahi’s words, “nomadism” and “nativism,” much as Kashua’s Arab characters think of themselves as “immigrants” to or “natives” of Jerusalem. Ziad’s exhortations for Philip (whom he mistakes for Pipik) to become a PLO agent include not just the delegitimization of Zionism but also the glorification of diasporic Jewishness in the service of Palestinian nationalism. All this absurdity, and particularly the insistence that these ideologies are mutually exclusive, underscores the similarities of the two nationalisms pitted against each other. When Philip rejects Ziad’s arguments, he does so not because he does not believe in the Palestinian right to self-determination; when he rejects the Mossad agents Supposnik and Smilesberger, he does so not because he is against the idea of Israel. Rather, he is loath to relinquish his self in the service of any ideology.

Philip and Amir both long to escape the bonds of ideologically circumscribed identity and to inhabit a self that accommodates fragmentation without collapsing. Despite such compelling parallels in the two novels’ engagement with identity, they ultimately deal with it differently. While Philip is besieged by ambiguity, the subject and his original identity are utterly eliminated in Kashua’s novel. Instead of living with radical instability, Amir destroys it and performs stability through an adopted identity. While Philip arrives at a tense cease-fire with ambiguity through his desire to shake off his double, Amir aspires to artificial clarity through an attempt to become his double.
“THIS IS MY CORPSE”

In conclusion, I want to invoke two profoundly uncanny scenes in which Philip and Amir are confronted with their own deaths. Midway through *Operation Shylock*, Philip watches Pipik sleeping and thinks: “This is my corpse. I am sitting here alive even though I am dead. I am sitting here after my death. . . . I am here sitting *shivah* for myself.”62 At the end of *Second Person Singular*, Amir—now known on his ID card as Yonatan—buries himself, Amir, as a foreigner in the Muslim cemetery at Beit Safafa. Actualizing Philip’s fantasy, he is witnessing the spectacle of his own burial. We might read these scenes as illustrating the disintegration that these characters have experienced taken to its extreme; the only way to integrate one’s self is to claim it in its entirety by annihilating competing selves. Philip’s double, however, is not actually dead, and neither is he. At the end of the novel, uncertain but hopeful that Pipik is dead, he finds that his “homicidal daydream” is insufficient to quiet his agitated soul, so he decides on another course of action: he imagines a letter from Jinx Possesski relating Pipik’s death.63 Instead of reassuring him, though, the imagined letter convinces him that Pipik still lives. He despairs: this letter “proclaimed . . . the resurgence of Pipik’s powers and the resumption of his role as my succubus. He and no one else had written this letter to plunge me back into that paranoiac no-man’s-land.”64 This, despite his knowledge that the letter is a product of his own imagination. The bizarre scene confirms his earlier insight: “Even worse than never being free of him, I’ll never be free of myself; . . . Pipik will follow me all the days of my life, and I will dwell in the house of Ambiguity forever.”65

In Kashua’s novel, on the other hand, there is nothing ambiguous about Amir’s relation to his double or about the decision he makes. One man is dead, and another still lives. On the way to the cemetery to bury Yonatan, Amir is compelled by “a burning desire to take photographs,” though he does not have his camera: “It seemed to me like the only reasonable way to pass the next few minutes, behind the lens of a camera. To press, swivel, document, hide, distance myself from the events.”66 As the key that grants Amir access to Yonatan’s future by opening the door to the prestigious Bezalel Academy, photography is a crucial element in Amir’s
becoming Yonatan. His urge to take pictures at this charged moment, literally on the verge of burying his past self, can be understood as a means of grappling with mortality. For Roland Barthes, photographs record a moment that no longer is and therefore encompass death.\textsuperscript{67} In this light, we might consider the portraits in which Amir specializes at Bezalel as a mode of mourning his own death: as he does the work of usurping Yonatan’s subjectivity, he processes the loss of his own by taking portraits of other people. On the way to the cemetery, thinking about photography as “an act of non-intervention,” in Susan Sontag’s words, helps Amir negotiate his own role as the disinterested Jewish outsider he has become and Yonatan’s as the despised alien whom Amir had been.\textsuperscript{68} The deceased is repeatedly referred to as an “a’rib,” a “foreigner,” a “stranger,” “not someone from the village.”\textsuperscript{69} As Amir watches, the undertaker’s assistants rush through the washing ceremony and fail to recite the prayer for the dead. People discuss the deceased as a collaborator and lament that their cemetery has become “a garbage dump for foreigners.” A man spits into the open grave.\textsuperscript{70} The grotesque scene confirms that he has made the right decision by “killing” Amir. When he returns to Ruchaleh’s house, he begins “sterilization,” his “code word for the initial first step” of clearing the house and eradicating the past—both Yonatan’s and his own.\textsuperscript{71} Decisively breaking from the notion that “a man with no past has no future,” Amir demonstrates that liberation from the past is the only means to a future.

Though death looms large in experiences of psychological and corporeal divisions and duplications, its actual or fantasized manifestation in the double does not translate to harmonious integration of the self that remains. More to the point, though, it is not clear that such a harmonious integration is possible or even desirable. For the characters of Roth and Kashua, splitting, doubling, disintegration, and transgression of boundaries are processes that challenge but cannot necessarily overcome worn ideological typologies. Resisting facile discourses of victim and oppressor, minority and majority, they rail against the ideological paradigms that suffocate the self in the name of collective identities.
NOTES

* A Hebrew version of this article was originally written for a forthcoming essay collection on Sayed Kashua’s writings, edited by Adia Mendelson-Maoz and Liat Steir-Livny.

1. The quotation in this essay’s title is one of the epigraphs in Operation Shylock. Taken from Kierkegaard’s Repetition (1843), it provides a link to Dostoyevsky, whose doubles have been related to a philosophical preoccupation of nineteenth-century Europe and Russia: the question of being as opposed to ethical being. Dmitri Chizhevsky asserts the question of “the loss of the ontological ‘fixity’ of the self” posed by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and others as a key to understanding the philosophical motivation of Dostoyevsky’s doubles (“Theme of the Double,” 123). Debra Shostak, Elaine M. Kauvar, and others have commented on Dostoyevsky’s influence on Roth’s doubles in Operation Shylock. For an authoritative analysis of doubles in Dostoyevsky, see Chizhevsky, “Theme of the Double.”

2. Roth, Operation Shylock, 274.

3. Through an analysis of Kashua’s newspaper columns, David Hadar argues that Kashua promotes his own similarities to Roth in order to shape his own image in the perception of the Israeli public (“Sayed Kashua’s Complaint”).

4. Roth, Operation Shylock, 20, 22.

5. Roth, Operation Shylock, 27.

6. Roth, Operation Shylock, 13, 399.

7. Freud, Uncanny, 142.

8. Faurholt, “Self as Other.”

9. Faurholt, “Self as Other.”


12. Like the uncanny and the figure of the doppelgänger, these states are the purview of psychoanalysis but are intimately involved with literature; all have been theorized through literary texts. Kristeva writes that literature “represents the ultimate coding of our crises, of our most intimate and most serious apocalypses. Hence its nocturnal power . . . [as] an unveiling of the abject” (Powers of Horror, 208). Where Freud bases his analysis of the unheimlich on E. T. A. Hoffmann’s “The Sandman,” Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
analyzes paranoia through gothic texts, and Kristeva illustrates her formulation of the abject through Dostoyevsky, Joyce, Proust, Borges, Artaud, and Céline. Sedgwick characterizes “paranoid knowing” as “inescapably narrative” because “paranoia is characterized by placing, in practice, an extraordinary stress on the efficacy of knowledge per se—knowledge in the form of exposure” (“Paranoid Reading,” 138).

13. Klein characterizes paranoia as a “position” (the paranoid-schizoid position) rather than a “stage,” as it was previously understood. This restructuring means that paranoia could be understood as a “shifting psychic vantage point” rather than a “strict chronology” (Kristeva, Melanie Klein, 66). Klein theorizes that infants experience persecutory anxiety, a consequence of the infant’s projection of his own aggressive impulses. As a protective defense against this anxiety, the infant—who has not yet developed the capacity to engage with complete objects—splits the mother into a “good breast” and a “bad breast,” a fragmentation that the infant internalizes. These part-objects are part of the process of the development of self, giving way eventually to the integration of the “good” and “bad” fragments in a coherent self.


17. McAfee, Julia Kristeva, 57.

18. The critical literature on doubles in Philip Roth is extensive. Most of these studies consider Operation Shylock together with other novels that offer alternative conceptions of the self, such as the Zuckerman trilogy (The Ghost Writer [1979], Zuckerman Unbound [1981], and The Anatomy Lesson [1983]), The Counterlife (1986), The Human Stain (2000), and The Plot against America (2004). Shostak considers questions of subjectivity throughout Roth’s oeuvre, with a focus on masculinity, embodiment, and Jewish American identity (Philip Roth). In the context of Operation Shylock, she posits that the double is a function of the play and impersonation that allow Roth to challenge the notion of an essentialized Jewish identity. Safer considers the comic irony undergirding Roth’s doubles as the foundation of the postmodern skepticism regarding the self (Mocking the Age). Kauvar considers how, in Operation Shylock and other novels, factual events and the way they are perceived affect notions
of the self and subjectivity, which for Roth are always based on multiplicity, contradiction, and conflict (‘This Doubly Reflected Communication’). Hermione Lee’s essay on doubles in Roth, though its publication preceded that of Operation Shylock by seven years, offers a far-reaching consideration of the multiple and often contradictory influences on the self in Roth’s fiction (‘You Must Change Your Life’). Alter, in his review of Operation Shylock for the New Republic, decries Roth’s preoccupation with the self as limited to his own self, drily asserting that “Philip Roth is always writing about Philip Roth” (‘Spritzer,’ 33). Numerous others have considered the question of Jewish American identity in Roth’s novels. See, for example, Grumberg, “Necessary Wounds”; Rubin-Dorsky, “Philip Roth”; Royal, “Postmodern Jewish Identity”; and Schreier, Impossible Jew. Ranen Omer-Sherman (“Paradoxes of Identity”) has compared the split subjectivity represented in Kashua’s story “Cinderella” to that portrayed by Mizrahi Hebrew author Almog Behar in his 2005 story “Ana’ min al-yahud” (I am of the Jews). Batya Shimoni has proposed the concept “Jewish-Arab” to discuss the representation of conflicted identity in Kashua’s story and in Second Person Singular (“Shaping Israeli-Arab Identity”). Rachel S. Harris reads Kashua’s novel in the context of passing and hybridity (“Hebraizing the Arab-Israeli”). Gil Hochberg has written about Kashua’s subversion of conventional categories of national identity (“To Be or Not to Be”). Adia Mendelson-Maoz and Liat Steir-Livny address Kashua’s drawing upon stereotypes of Diaspora Jews and Israeli Jews to argue for an ambivalence in his representation of Arab identity (“Jewish Works of Sayed Kashua”). Though the Palestinian Israeli author Anton Shammas differs from Kashua substantively, it is worth noting that the doppelgänger motif is central to his novel Arabesques (1986) and indicates a skepticism similar to that in Kashua’s novel regarding the possibility of a whole, unified identity. Rachel Feldhay Brenner has considered these phenomena in Shammas’s novel. While she interprets doubling and fragmentation in Arabesques in terms of “the identity quest of the Israeli Arab,” I see Kashua as mobilizing similar techniques not to find identity but to lose it—to shake off the concept of identity itself (“In Search of Identity,” 444).

19. Hochberg, “To Be or Not to Be,” 70.
20. Hochberg, “To Be or Not to Be,” 70.
22. Roth, Operation Shylock, 200–201.
23. Roth, Operation Shylock, 115.
24. In a compelling twist, Naomi B. Sokoloff has written an essay comparing Appelfeld to Kashua. See Sokoloff, “Jewish Character?”
25. In the context of the lawyer and the Israeli Palestinian identity to which he lays claim, it is useful to consider Sander Gilman’s explication of Jewish self-hatred: “This illusory definition of the self . . . contains an inherent, polar opposition. On the one hand is the liberal fantasy that anyone is welcome to share in the power of the reference group if he abides by the rules that define that group. . . . On the other hand is the hidden qualification of the internalized reference group: . . . The more you are like me, the more I know the true value of my power, which you wish to share, and the more I am aware that you are but a shoddy counterfeit, an outsider” (Jewish Self-Hatred, 2).
26. Shostak, Philip Roth, 142.
27. Roth, Operation Shylock, 22.
29. Roth, Operation Shylock, 55.
30. Roth, Operation Shylock, 303.
32. Shostak, Philip Roth, 141.
33. Roth, Operation Shylock, 206.
35. Roth, Operation Shylock, 23.
36. Kashua, Second Person Singular, 89.
37. McAfee, Julia Kristeva, 45.
38. Roth, Operation Shylock, 94–95.
41. Kashua, Second Person Singular, 89.
42. Kashua, Second Person Singular, 90.
44. Kashua, Second Person Singular, 110.
The connection between photography and death has been theorized extensively. For Barthes, photographs designate a moment that will never recur and thus provide evidence of mortality (*Camera Lucida*). In a similar vein, Peggy Phelan writes that photographs serve as “a witness to life and as a rehearsal for death” (“Francesca Woodman’s Photography,” 980). Susan Sontag considers photographs “*memento mori*. To take a photograph is to participate in another person’s (or thing’s) mortality, vulnerability, mutability” (*On Photography*, 11). Yonatan himself had taken the concept of photographs as a rehearsal for death to its morbid extreme by abandoning his post behind the camera’s lens and training its lens on himself to photograph his own attempted suicide in stages, a series of photos that Amir later discovers.

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