

The John H. Glenn, Jr.
Oral History Project

Oral History Interview 13

with
John H. Glenn, Jr.

in the Hart Senate Office Building
in Washington, D.C.

June 23, 1997

Brien R. Williams
Interviewer

[Begin Interview 13, Tape 1, Side A]

WILLIAMS: This is the thirteenth interview. It is June 23, 1997. Senator John Glenn is in his office in the Hart Senate Office Building. This is Brien Williams.

We'll start, Senator, with an update on the campaign financing issue.

SEN. GLENN: All right. Well, this has been an ongoing saga, needless to say. I think after our last talk, what I was planning to do then, and what I did, was I thought this had reached such a ridiculous state of affairs on lack of cooperation back and forth, that I should do everything I could to try and get the thing worked out. I was afraid that maybe some of our past efforts and meetings had been—I won't say thwarted—but had not been as effective as they might have been because of staff members and everybody that was there. I thought if I could sit down with Chairman Fred Thompson just one on one, just the two of us in a room by ourselves, we might be able to bring something around on this thing and get some

agreement on it.

So this is what I proposed. I did that, I got an appointment with him and went over to his office and sat down. I told him what I wanted to do was—I'd like to know what the Republicans want Democrats to do in this whole campaign finance investigation, and I'd like him to know what the Democrats would like to have the Republicans do.

The situation, as I saw it, had gotten all bogged down by the fact that we're all talking about subpoenas and emphasis on subpoenas, and that that was not just the whole show, important though it was. The day I went over, I think they had requested 142 subpoenas and they had issued 142 subpoenas. Most of those I did not disagree with. But twice during all that process I had objected, which I have the formal right to do, which means then that you have to have a committee meeting to vote them out. I had objected not because I disagreed with the subpoenas, but because we were being treated so shabbily on our side in the subpoenas that we had requested. We had requested fifty-four at that time, and I think sixteen is all we have. So 142 to 16 was the count.

But even at that, I thought that we needed to stop the emphasis on subpoenas. I suggested—I said there were people, I knew there were people on his side that don't want any cooperation at all with Democrats. We have a few people on our side who are pretty anti what they're trying to do, also, but let's just put that behind us and let's decide not what people want us not to do, but let's decide what we will do and then go with it. If we don't do something like that,

then both sides are going to go downhill.

I said that I thought that the emphasis, rather than being on specific individuals by name, what we should be doing is concentrating on the areas of campaign finance that we know are wrong. Did foreign money come into the campaigns? If it did, we should track that down, whether it is Democrat, Republican, or whatever it is, because that's bad. Were there security violations hooked up with it? Obviously, we have to look at something like that. Beyond that, were there third-party transfers of money? Were there tax-exempt organizations that misused their tax-exempt status and got over into the political area and were a conduit for money in that area? All the soft money that was involved, we had to look into that.

Now, he wants to keep this on a phase one and phase two. Phase one part of the investigation would be on the illegalities, which would include foreign money and any illegalities on the tax-exempts, or where the law was actually broken. We would look into that first, and then save the phase two part until later in the year, after we'd been able to look into the illegalities.

WILLIAMS: Phase two would be the improprieties?

SEN. GLENN: Improprieties as such, yes. Now, the requests before the committee for subpoenas at the time I had my meeting with him, both sides had in multiple subpoena requests. The Republicans had another thirteen regular ones and another eighteen on immunity, so they had about an additional thirty-one or thirty-two requests, something like that. On our side, we had the remainder of the fifty-

four that we had requested, and had only been granted sixteen, I think it was. So we had somewhere around thirty-some. In other words, there was a balance there.

What I suggested to Fred was, let's just forget all this subpoena count from before, the 140 or 16 or whatever. Here we had a balance right now and why couldn't we start a new policy right now that as long as—we'll just forget all this count that we've emphasized before. Let's start a new page. Here we have an even balance of subpoenas being requested, approximately. Why don't we just set a new policy that says that if the subpoenas on either side are in scope, we would issue them, unless there's something just really seriously wrong with them. Let's move ahead with concentrating on these areas of foreign money and soft money, third-party money transfers, tax-exempt violations, things like that.

The fact that while he has kept saying for a long time we don't want to do phase two subpoenas now, the facts are that unless you get started with the subpoenas now, they're not going to be useful the rest of this year. We're supposed to end this thing by the end of this year. We know that the first subpoenas that were issued in late January or early February, we're still getting some of the documents in to this day from those subpoenas. That's five months later. So, unless we get all the subpoenas out now, there won't be the thorough investigation we should have in the fall, even presuming that we get through phase one, which is not a good thing to surmise, I don't think.

Well, we discussed this for some time, and I said if we didn't do something like that, it seemed to me that we're just going to see this investigation deteriorate

over a subpoena-count issue and their people were going to be mad he was giving any. My people would be mad they're not giving enough to us and that we're being dealt with unfairly and that was that.

Well, we talked then about some of these problems that I mentioned a moment ago, that some of his subpoenas involved granted immunity to certain witnesses. We talked about that a little bit, and that has since become a major item of contention. What they want to do is—all the Buddhist priests out at this temple where there was some fundraising activity on behalf of Democrats, and the place where Al Gore visited, they want to grant immunity to some eighteen Buddhist priests, or monks, in return for their testimony about how the money came to them and how it was transferred and so on.

Now, I do not object to looking into that matter. Certainly it's a valid thing to look into, and I think we should look into it. But they were asking us to grant immunity to these eighteen people without any allegations about what happened, without any charges, without us even knowing the names of the individuals. In another words, a block grant for eighteen people and without any of the normal precautions that you go through with the FBI, where we know the FBI is investigating some of these instances of money coming in illegally like that. The normal procedure is to get the FBI to consider these people and tell you whether there is other criminal activity they are investigating on those people before you grant immunity.

You remember the problem we got into with Ollie North where the

congressional committee gave him a certain immunity. Then later on the prosecution the Justice Department had prepared to go ahead with was largely knocked out because of the immunity grant he had received, I think improperly, from the Senate. So we don't want to do that, have the Justice Department and the FBI looking into certain crimes that some of those people may have committed and when we give them immunity it would immunize them from prosecution under those crimes.

Normal procedure is that you have the FBI check these things, that you have a statement of the allegations, or charges against the people, and that you have, first and foremost, what is called in legal circles a proffer. A proffer being a statement of what the person is willing to testify to if you give them immunity from other prosecution. We don't have a proffer, we didn't have charges, we had no allegations, we didn't have the names, and yet they were asking us to grant immunity. Now, they later reduced the eighteen down to fifteen that they really wanted, but that still was not what should be done.

Well, anyway, that meeting with Thompson came to nothing. He just couldn't see—he said basically what I was asking for is everything we had asked for before. I was asking him to cave in on his side, which wasn't what I was trying to do at all.

WILLIAMS: That meeting it was really, literally just the two of you in a room?

SEN. GLENN: Just the two of us in a room—nobody else. I didn't want anybody else in there, because I wanted to get his views on this and I wanted the two of us to discuss it

and see if we couldn't come to some agreement.

WILLIAMS: How was your interaction? How would you characterize that over the course of the meeting?

SEN. GLENN: Well, it started out friendly enough and I kept it low-key. I was as conciliatory as I've ever been in my life, or tried to be, because I really do want this thing to get back on track again. I truly do. Anyway, he would not go along with it. We flared up a couple of times during this two—it was a two-hour meeting. We talked for a long, long time. There were a couple of times we got a little exercised in our statements, but then calmed down and got back to discussing the basic issue.

But what we agreed to was very little. I said there were three points that I wanted out of the meeting if we could get them. That we would put out all the subpoenas that were in scope on both sides. That was first. Number two, that we'd follow up to get information. We'd both work together to try and make sure that whoever was subpoenaed we really would cooperate in getting the people to really respond to the subpoena in a way that would be meaningful. Number three, then, that we wanted a role at the hearings. We have no idea yet what our minority role is going to be at the hearings. So those are the three things that I wanted.

His answers were, no, yes, yes. In other words, no to the first—to put out all subpoenas that were in scope. Yes to number two—this was to follow-up to get information on both sides. And, number three—discuss our role at the

hearings, he was willing to do that. Well, that was going to have to save itself for another meeting.

We had a committee meeting then, which was a week ago, just about a week ago, a week or ten days ago, a week ago last Thursday, whatever the date that would be. I don't know. Anyway, we had a committee meeting and it once again became pretty rancorous, with charges on both sides. This idea of immunity was discussed at that meeting in an open session. We finally decided that we couldn't make much progress in that particular meeting, so we adjourned to the back room to discuss this immunity thing with just principals and staff, but no public. Fred opened that meeting with a rather rancorous statement of how we have been delaying things and how we had not been cooperative. These things were just flat not true. While I had not gone to the meeting with the idea of making it a confrontational-type meeting, I couldn't sit and accept that sort of criticism that was not true. So I responded, and the meeting was not a very good meeting.

He started off saying how we'd deteriorated into nothing but squabbles, how there were hollow accusations being made against him, which he didn't define, and the majority. How the minority was trying to delay things, which we're not. We don't have the power to delay if we wanted to. The only salute he could make was to Democratic obstruction capabilities—that he knew some of the people that they wanted to get in were going to come in and take the Fifth. He hoped that we'd be able to cooperate in trying to prevent that. That we were

somehow blocking this trip abroad, this investigative trip to the Far East, that some of the people are on now, and how I had turned down signing a joint letter to both the Democratic and Republican party headquarters that would encourage them to respond to our subpoenas. He felt this might have been the last chance and he was skeptical that we'd be able to work this out.

Now, this came after I had been to his office and had tried to work out something. I felt this was sort of a slap in the face over what I had tried to do. So I responded to each one of these points, in addition to sort of reciting how we got to where we are now. I went back and I went through all the things I had proposed to him at our private meeting, and laid those out publicly for the press and everybody to hear. As far as the squabbles, I said that there certainly have been squabbles. I didn't quarrel with that. On all the hollow accusations, I thought every accusation that had been made off our side on lack of subpoenas and so on was absolutely true. If he knew anything else, I wanted to know what accusations he was talking about that were hollow accusations, because I thought that was a hollow charge in itself. He didn't respond to that.

As far as the delay, which has been something they've tried to sell, and a lot of the press has bought into this idea, that we on the Democratic side are delaying this thing, the fact is, we can't delay if we wanted to. We don't have the power. The only power of delay I have as the ranking minority member, or that any of our members have, is if they want a subpoena and they submit a subpoena to me for approval, I have three things I can do: I can approve it and say, yes, send

it. I can say I'm taking no action on it. In either of those cases, it goes. Or, if I formally object to that subpoena going out, then committee rules say that the committee has to meet if they want to vote that subpoena out, and they have to meet within seventy-two hours.

Now, that's the only power I have, is to delay a subpoena for seventy-two hours. So on two occasions I have done this with blocks of subpoenas. I've delayed them for seventy-two hours and they went out. The total, as of when we are talking right now, is we have out twenty-four out of the fifty-eight we've requested. They have out 160 out of the 160 that they requested. So that indicates where the power is. The majority has complete power to control this thing.

Let me add something on the seventy-two-hour rule. That only applies where they are submitting a request for a subpoena to the minority. We can hold it up for seventy-two hours and then it goes out with a committee vote. If I submit a subpoena to them, the seventy-two-hour rule does not apply from the minority. That's the way our rules read. In other words, they can just ignore our request for subpoena, which is what they've done, because we have some that haven't been acted on that were put in back in March. So we don't have the power to stop anything.

Now, one area we do have power—and this is the only power that goes beyond that seventy-two-hour delay. The only other thing is our committee rules say that if there is a request for immunity, and there is objection, then you need a two-thirds vote of the committee to vote that subpoena out. That means with our

current ratios and members on the committee that they would have to have all of their votes and two of our votes on the Democratic side to get a two-thirds vote. Now, so far, where we stand right now—those were the ones that we discussed the other day in committee, in that committee meeting and in the private committee meeting that we had in the back room after we broke up the public session. We told them then we could not—they were complaining bitterly that we were going to hold up the investigation. We were complaining bitterly that at least you could let us know whether there had been any proffers, or what the allegations are, or the names of the people, or whether the FBI has had a chance to look at these things and tell us whether other charges were pending against some of these people we'd be granting immunity to, which is just normal procedure in these things.

Well, that discussion did not do much good, but what did happen that same evening was that Senator Thompson and I got on the phone with [U.S. Attorney General] Janet Reno to find out what was being done to give a fast screening once these names were submitted to Justice. She told us that they had tried to follow up on finding out what the plea was or what the charges were and what the answer was going to be from the lawyer for the Buddhist monks and priests. The lawyer representing them was on another case and had told her [Attorney General Reno] personally that he would be able to come in with the first four of these people on June the 25th, this coming Wednesday—it being Monday as we're talking here—and that she would give us a twenty-four [hour] turnaround

on the FBI letting us know whether there were any potential charges, other than these campaign charges, against any of these people. So she would give us a twenty-four turnaround [hour] so we would have our answer on whether we then should vote for immunity and grant immunity to these people.

The chairman didn't care much for waiting that long. This meeting I'm talking about was last Wednesday, I guess it was. She would guarantee us a twenty-four turnaround on looking at these people. The chairman said he understood that she had had this list of names since March, but she indicated they had not had them in an investigative way, certainly, since March, and that she would put enough people on to make sure that we really would get our answers over here within a twenty-four-hour period. Now, that's where we stand on it right now. Since that time, since last week, they have given us an additional three subpoenas.

There's one other thing that happened in here, too. I knew there was something I was leaving out. During some of our earlier discussions, where we had a staff and a very few senators meet over in Senator Thompson's office. He would meet and call in on his side, usually, [Don] Nickles and [Thad] Cochran and, on occasion, [Arlen] Specter, who is on their side. I would bring along with me Senator [Carl] Levin and Senator [Joseph I.] Lieberman, as well as the other staff members involved. During one of our discussions over there at an earlier meeting, Senator Levin and Senator Specter had come up with some ideas as sort of a compromise. Those were turned down, but I sensed at that time that Senator

Thompson was reasonably well disposed toward listening to the compromise as it came from them, rather than just coming from me. I think he feels—wrongly, I might add—but he feels that I am being influenced too much by Senator [Thomas A.] Daschle, the minority leader, and people at the White House, which is absolutely untrue.

In fact, back when we started this whole thing, I told Senator Daschle if I was going to run it, I'd run it, and if they wanted to pull the strings from over there, well, get somebody else, even though I was ranking minority member. So while I have kept him informed at every single step of the way, it is because all of our whole caucus—all the Democrats in the Senate—are interested in what's going on. So I've kept Senator Daschle fully advised all the way through. They've made suggestions, but there's never been a time when he just told me, "John, here's what you have to do," because that wouldn't work.

With the White House—which has been the other charge as we've gone along—I made a rule early on that I would not have personal contact with the White House on this matter. This should be handled counsel to counsel, and that's the reason we have a counsel for the investigation on our side. The contacts with the White House, with regard to subpoenas and requests for information, those requests have been handled by both of our counsels on the Republican and Democratic side. They've gone to the White House and sat down with White House legal counsel and staff over there to work those things out. The point being, I don't want the contact with the White House. I'm not here to represent

them per se. I'm not here to represent anything, as I see it, except trying to get to the bottom of campaign finance reform, and that's what I've been trying to do.

So what has happened is that I asked and after one of our—where we got all of our Democrats together and staff to talk about what direction we thought we ought to go—we weren't coming to much of a conclusion. I recalled that Senator Thompson had been well disposed toward Levin and Specter working together. I asked Levin if he would get back together with Specter and see if they could come up with a suggested compromise that we could live with and that they could live with. I thought something along the lines of what I had proposed to Senator Thompson in our one-on-one meeting would be appropriate, and he agreed to do that. As of now, he has met with Specter two or three times, and Specter has a meeting planned with Thompson tomorrow morning to present some compromise ideas to him and see what kind of reaction he gets. That's sort of where we stand.

Now, the immunity thing still stands in our way. They have submitted three other subpoenas besides the immunity subpoenas last Thursday and Friday. One of them matured today at ten o'clock this morning. So, hoping that there will be something friendly worked out, I said on that subpoena to go ahead and let it go. I would not object to it, and that I would let them know about the other two subpoenas tomorrow afternoon, which will be in the afternoon after Specter has a chance to see Thompson in the morning, if you follow all that. In other words, I don't want to rock the boat here if we have a chance of getting something back on track. So that's sort of where we stand.

Now, the other thing that has developed—and I'm sure I mentioned this in a time before when we talked about campaign finance reform—one of the subpoenas they did approve, with the first six they approved, was one that we had wanted on the National Policy Forum. I think I talked about that some before. So let me just upgrade where we are on that one.

The people involved with that National Policy Forum and with Ambrose Young out of Hong Kong that I described before, those people have come forward now and have given depositions to our staff, which are sworn statements that are just as good as though they were subpoenaed. They have given sworn statements about what happened. Mr. Benson Becker is the lawyer for the Young group out of Hong Kong, although he's from Florida himself. He gave a deposition as to how that money—how they planned to run it through, how they planned to take the soft money as it was being given and convert into hard money so it could be used in Republican congressional campaigns.

We also had Mr. Richard Richards, who was a previous chairman of the Republican Party back years ago. He was also a lawyer for this Young group and thought they were dealt with very, very badly. He wrote a very, very detailed letter to Haley Barber when he resigned as president of the National Policy Forum, and laid it out very cold. He came in and gave a deposition, a sworn statement, swearing to all the things that he had in that letter that he had written to Haley Barber.

We have one other thing. Mr. Becker indicated that Ambrose Young

would also be willing to give a deposition to us, even though we did not have a subpoena for him, which we had asked for and were declined. He'd be glad to give a sworn statement anyway, but he won't come in this country because there's a subpoena out for him, but he would meet us someplace else. We made arrangements for him first to meet in Tokyo, come from Hong Kong to Tokyo. But then sometimes taking depositions in Japan—there seems to be some problem with this, with their judicial system and our judicial system. So it was recommended that we not do it in Japan. So he volunteered to go to London. So our chief counsel, Alan Baren [phonetic], went to London over the weekend, is over there, and will take this deposition, sworn statement, from Ambrose Young and his attorney over there tomorrow morning, and he'll be back here then by Thursday of this week.

So that sort of closes the loop on this as the case for foreign money coming in. As we sit here right now, the only proven track of foreign money coming in from abroad into the...

[Begin Tape 1, Side 2]

SEN. GLENN: As of this date, today, the only proven track of foreign money coming in from abroad into the last political campaign was on the Republican side with Young, this Young Brothers out of Hong Kong, coming in through the National Policy Forum, where it was somehow converted over into hard money and given to the Republican National Committee and was used in the campaign. They were

supposed to pay that back. It was supposed to be a loan. But Haley Barber decided, after paying some back on the loan, that he wasn't going to pay any more, and he, in effect, stiffed them. He just didn't pay any more on it. They were irate about it. After all the promises that had been made. They had made very specific promises that if they loaned that money it would be paid back, including being paid back by the RNC, Republican National Committee, if necessary. Barber just stopped paying on it, refused to honor what he had committed to in writing, and they actually wound up about \$700,000 out of pocket that never was paid back. So, in effect, that 700,000 was a contribution to the Republicans in the last campaign.

We now have Becker, the statements by Becker and by Richard Richards. We'll have Mr. Young's statement himself, a deposition, later this week. Haley Barber told the Republican majority on the committee—in fact, he has said this publicly—that he'd come in voluntarily without a subpoena and testify. We took him at his word. He is the one that we'll have to use to close the loop on this because we have all of the facts in the case and now we need two things: we need him to come and testify and we need a subpoena for his records. I don't want to subpoena him personally, if we can possibly avoid it, and I've told Fred Thompson that. But we do want the records that he kept out of the National Policy Forum, which was the conduit they used to bring this money in. We have been refused that subpoena repeatedly.

Haley Barber said he would come in voluntarily. We have sent him two

letters so far, trying to set up a time and we've had no reply to the letters. A telephone call to his lawyer said that the lawyer would discuss it with us at a later date. So we're in the process of being stiffed now by what Haley Barber said he would do and is not now doing. So that's where we stand with that one. But that one to date is the only proven track of foreign money coming into the last political campaign.

Now, saying that does not mean I'm trying to excuse John Huang and what may have happened there. I don't know whether money came in from that track or not. We have out several dozen subpoenas now involving all sorts of all the bank records and the associations. Everything to do with John Huang is out there on subpoena. Huang has said that he will take the Fifth. So I think we need to follow up on that, and I believe that strongly, even though it was a Democratic administration and John Huang was working for a Democratic administration. But I think the charges there are serious enough, not only foreign money coming in, but also the fact that he had a security clearance. There's some question as to whether he passed, not military matters, I don't think, but passed economic information to some of the Lippo [phonetic] group, the Riyadis and the Lippo group and all that gang. That's something that I think we do have to look into. But there are already several dozen [subpoenas] out in that direction and we can't get a subpoena for Haley Barber's records.

One other thing on Haley Barber's records, too, that just popped to mind. The *New York Times*, they had an informant that used to work in the National

Policy Forum, apparently. That informant said, in quotes—and I'm not sure these are the exact words—but there were "other foreign sources." It was "other foreign sources" of money that came through the National Policy Forum, in addition to what came in from the Young Brothers in Hong Kong. That's the reason we want Haley Barber's records.

We had a subpoena on NPF. We have that, which I think they issued mistakenly, because we had that one. It just turned out it happened to come out a few days before the *Time* magazine article that broke this story about money coming in from Hong Kong. I'm sure we would not have been given that subpoena had we asked for it after the *Time* magazine article came out. That came out, but we were told when the subpoena was served on the NPF that the NPF has been disbanded and they don't have any records.

That's the reason we would like Haley Barber's records. He was the head of the NPF. He either has the records himself or knows where they are, or, if not, he should know. Since they had applied to be a tax-exempt organization, they have certain requirements of recordkeeping under that application, as I understand it. The IRS never granted them their tax-exempt status, even though it was advertised as a tax-exempt group. So that raises a lot of questions in itself that we want to follow up on. But the next step should be to give us the subpoena for Haley Barber's records. That still stands. That's still before the committee, and they refuse to grant it. I keep asking about it and we keep bringing it up every time there is a meeting, and they refuse to grant it.

I was told in one of our meetings earlier—I don't think I said this earlier. I was told in one of the meetings in Chairman Thompson's office, when [Don] Nickels and [Thad] Cochran were there, and I had [Carl] Levin and [Joseph I.] Lieberman with me. Things had been getting a little testy and the tempers had been going up a little bit. Cochran told me—and this isn't an exact quote, but it's close to it—that, "You people forget who won the election. We won the election. We're going to run this, and I think Fred Thompson gave you too many subpoenas to begin with. If it had been up to me, I wouldn't have given you any." So that's the attitude that has prevailed through some of these meetings.

So, we're being, in effect, cut out as much as possible. I think the cutting us out reflects the wishes of the majority leader and leadership on the Republican side. They do not want campaign finance reform. They have fought all this year against the McCain-Feingold Bill coming to the floor, a bill that I'm a co-sponsor of, and Fred Thompson is a co-sponsor of that, too. I think Fred started out being serious about wanting campaign finance reform across the board, but he's been so hemmed in by his Republican leadership. What they want to make this into is a Republican investigation of Democrats. And even though we have a lot of material to look into on the other side, if we're going to really look at all campaign finance reform, they have denied us that so far. I think it's under the push of Trent Lott and Nickels and Cochran, who are on the committee—well, Lott is not on the committee. The Rules Committee, then, that has Lott and [Mitch] McConnell and [Rick] Santorum, Cochran, Kay Bailey Hutchison, people like that who make no

bones about it. They do not want campaign finance reform. So I think that's the problem we have, where I don't know what we're going to be able to do as we move on toward having hearings.

Thompson has announced that the hearings will start on July the 8th, but they have not yet announced or not given us any indication of what we will take up at that meeting. I wrote him a letter last week, after the July 8th date was announced, saying I thought it would be only fair for us to know what the subject was going to be at the hearings, who the witnesses would be—that's normally announced ahead of hearings—and what the role of the minority would be.

I got a letter back from him, that I got just this morning here when I returned from the weekend, and this was apparently delivered Friday after I had left to fly up to Ohio. But he said that he had my letter and was "beginning to focus on the very questions you are asking." He wants to get together this week, get my input on these matters. There are also some procedural matters we need to resolve as to how long each member should question, what the time limit would be on questions, whether members can give time to each other if they don't want to question at that particular time. We need to work these things out as a committee, which I agree with, before we get on with it.

That sort of catches us up on where we are with the campaign finance reform. It's not a very pleasant picture. It's certainly not the way I wanted to spend 1997, looking at something like this. Although it could have been productive and you could have had the feeling we were really doing something

good if we had been permitted to cooperate on this the way that I thought we should be permitted to do.

I repeat what I said on one of the other tapes, I think, and that is that when this thing started out, I proposed that we operate like they did in the Iran *Contra* Committee, where Warren Rudman and Dan [Daniel K.] Inouye operated hand-in-glove. They didn't spend any money unless both agreed. They didn't put out subpoenas unless both agreed. They agreed neither one would be on TV unless the other one was on TV—things I suggested at that time and Chairman Thompson has indicated sort of a favorable response to that. I thought that was sort of the way we were going to operate, until we came up to the day when over a weekend they dumped fifty-four subpoenas on us, all aimed at Democrats only, and the bipartisanship sort of went out the window.

So I'm disappointed in it and I don't like the way we've been treated so far. They have done a masterful job over on their side of selling the idea that we are somehow delaying the hearings. That is just not true, because I don't have the power to delay the hearings if I wanted to, except for this power of immunity. They do need a two-thirds vote and that requires two of our people to vote with them. Now, whether we want to do that or not, there may be some of our people who want to vote with them on that. So it may be a moot point as to what we want to do. We may be forced into going along with them on it. But that's a general summary of where we stand right now.

WILLIAMS: Mary McGrory's column yesterday in the [*Washington*] *Post* was a review of

Walsh's book that has just come out about Iran *Contra*, where he reiterates what a mistake it was to be giving immunity.

SEN. GLENN: Yes. I didn't read Mary yesterday. I'll have to get that out.

WILLIAMS: Also, David Broder had his column yesterday in the *Post*.

SEN. GLENN: Yes, I saw David Broder's column. David Broder came in here on Thursday and I sat with them and the staff and we talked for over an hour. How he could write that column after talking about it to us—I refused to sign the letter. Thompson wanted to send a letter to both Democrat and Republican National Committees deploring their production of documents and raising Cain, wanted to send the same letter to both. I refused to sign that letter that would go to both on the basis that the problems we've had with the Republicans, Republican National Committee, have been so much greater than the Democrats that to send the same letter to both sort of ignored the size of the problem.

Now, they've made a big thing out of that, that I somehow don't want to get to the bottom of this. That is just absolutely not true. What I wanted to do was send a separate letter to each one of them and make it a different letter. So far I think there have been sixty-some boxes of documents. These average 2,000 to 2,500 pages of whatever is in them per box. So we have sixty-one—we sent something like, I don't know, 120 to 150,000 pages of stuff that the DNC has given. They say, "Well, but it wasn't the stuff that we were looking for." Well, maybe it wasn't, but it was good enough that they have used that material to set up dozens of interviews so far, dozens of interviews.

From the Republican side, we got nothing for a long time. Then one day, in answer to our question about the organization, they sent us a 1997 phone book. Then they followed up, after we leaned on them very hard. They said they'd furnish information to us. We got four boxes of material, 25 percent of which was old news clips and things like that and 20 percent of the total production was redacted. They were blank pages marked "redacted." So I didn't think the two problems were the same and I don't yet.

WILLIAMS: Did anyone characterize what the wording of that letter would have been?

SEN. GLENN: No, I never had a sample letter. That never got beyond that. I told him, I just didn't think we ought to send the same letter to both of them and I declined to sign. They've made a big thing out of it. They've blown it out of all proportion.

The other thing they've blown out of all proportion is—they've said that I tried to stop sending people overseas to investigate. That is not true. My letter, which I gave to Broder and gave to [Morton] Kondrake who was in here and gave a copy to Mary McGrory when she was in here a week or so also, spelled out exactly what my views were on that. We originally planned for staff to go out there, and there were twenty-five people in the Far East we wanted to see. Most of them, or some of them, at least, are out there now because they left the States to avoid being subpoenaed here. But there were twenty-five people we wanted to set up appointments with. They first tried to set them up with the local embassies here that represent those countries, but the embassies would not set them up properly. So they said, "With our agreement with the United States, we have to

run these through the U.S. State Department." So the request was made to the State Department to set up these appointments out there at certain times. The State Department was unable to do it. Most of these people don't want to be talked to. They don't want to be interviewed by anybody on these subjects. As a result of the twenty-five requests, only two people agreed to be interviewed out of the whole trip to the Far East, and that was two people in Taiwan, and both of them were lesser players. There might be something turn up, but not too likely.

My letter to Thompson was—why don't we hold up on this thing until we know who we're going to talk to out there, so it will be more productive? That was the theme of my letter, and that's the whole tone of it. I gave copies of it to everybody when they were in here, Mary McGrory and David Broder and Morton Kondrake. What Broder did in his column was basically say, a pox on both our houses, as though we both are acting childish and should get back together again when I don't have power to do anything. They have all the power on the Republican side. So his column is just—David Broder the incisive academic student of politics. I don't see how he could possibly write that after what we told him here. Mary McGrory was a little better. Her column is not quite as wide read politically as David Broder's is. So I was disappointed in his column.

Morton Kondrake came out with a thing in the *Roll Call* newspaper here on the Hill. He's a regular. He's one of their executive editors or editorial writers or something. He's also on TV, on several of these programs that are on weekly. He wrote just a scathing column last week, laying this all at my doorstep. He had

bought the hook, line and sinker into what the Republicans had told him and hadn't even bothered to call over here and talk to me about it. I found that just atrocious. He talked about how I'd delay things. He talked about—I couldn't believe this, he said that I was acting as a partisan shill, pushed into the role by Tom [Thomas A.] Daschle, and so on. It said that, "Thompson has bent over backwards to conduct a bipartisan probe. What cooperation he got from Democrats on the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee is zero." He had a lot of stuff in here that just is exactly what the staff over on the Republican side of the committee has been saying, and I found it atrocious.

So we asked him to come in. I spent two hours with him here Friday morning, and I went through this thing from beginning to end with him. At the end of it he said, "Well, he wished he had known this before." We told, "Well, we wish you had, too." Why didn't he call? Well, there wasn't any answer to that.

So I'm waiting now to see what—he knows exactly the whole story, the truth of it, and we'll see whether he publishes anything. What I found in the past is usually these news people, particularly the better-known ones, are not willing really to change their position, no matter what the truth may be, once they've taken a particular stand, because, I guess, they're proud people, also, and they don't want to be looked at as having done sloppy work to begin with. But we'll see what comes out of some of these in the long haul.

WILLIAMS: In Broder's article he said that Lott had appointed a new member to the committee who was a strong opponent of campaign reform. Who was that?

SEN. GLENN: Nickels and Cochran, two of them.

WILLIAMS: That's what I thought you said, there were two, but he refers to only one.

SEN. GLENN: No, there were two. Well, Nickels is the most outspoken. Nickels publicly has said we don't need campaign finance reform. I'm not sure that Cochran has ever actually said that publicly, but he doesn't want campaign finance reform at all.

WILLIAMS: How do you read Specter on this?

SEN. GLENN: I think he'd like to see their side really open this up and give us the subpoenas we want. He's a former prosecutor himself from Philadelphia, and I think he'd like to see that. I think the odds of Thompson accepting the proposal that he and Levin might make, I think it's probably remote, but I'm certainly willing to go along with it.

WILLIAMS: One other point that you've already mentioned, actually. Broder claiming that you are in the pocket of Tom Daschle. You talked a little bit about that earlier. But just nail that one.

SEN. GLENN: That is absolutely not true. I have met with Tom repeatedly on this, mainly to keep him informed, because our whole caucus is interested in this thing, vitally interested in it, what's going to happen. I met with him repeatedly. We've had meetings in his office. I've had staff meetings over there, so his staff could be there, too. But as far as him playing me, him pulling the strings as though I'm a puppet out there someplace, just is flat not true.

WILLIAMS: So, basically, the exchange of information in the meetings you've had with him has been pretty much one way. You've been telling him what's been going on.

SEN. GLENN: I've been letting him know what I was doing and what was going on, and I've asked him what he thought our caucus would accept in certain areas. But as far as him ever sitting down and saying, "John, here's what you have to do. Here's what I think. There's only one way you can go on this and here it is," that just has never happened, and it's not going to happen. If that happened, I'd be off of this. I'd resign the chairmanship. I'd resign my ranking minority status on this. I have no reason whatsoever to get involved in being a shill, as Kondrake says. That's just repeating the line that he gets from the staff over there on the Republican side. It's just not true.

WILLIAMS: How do you feel being a non-lawyer in this kind of a situation?

SEN. GLENN: Oh, 90 percent of this is common sense. Some of it, when you get down to dealing with the technicalities of immunity and things like that, the lawyers have a better grasp of that going in than I do. There are plenty of lawyers around to give advice, so I don't lack for legal advice on this. So I haven't felt that I am out of step with everything just because I'm not a lawyer.

WILLIAMS: Has Senator Inouye contacted you at all as he's seen the struggles taking place here?

SEN. GLENN: No, quite the opposite. Well, not the opposite. I went to Danny Inouye first, when we first got into this thing. He ran the Iran *Contra* thing on a pretty good basis, I thought. And I went to him and asked.

WILLIAMS: Right, you said that.

SEN. GLENN: No, I've talked to him about it a few times in the cloakroom. You know, he's

asked me, "How are things going?" I'll tell him, and we'll talk about how different it is from the way he and Rudman operated. I've talked to him several times about that.

WILLIAMS: One other bit of unfinished business. We were going to talk a little bit about the Baltimore Democratic meeting and the Aspen trip to Spain. Would you like to do a little bit on that at this point? Let's take a pause here.

[Tape recorder turned off.]

SEN. GLENN: This is about the upcoming Hong Kong trip that I'm scheduled to go on to witness the changeover of Hong Kong status from Britain back to China, with a delegation going from the Senate and the House of Representatives together, leaving here on Friday the 27th. Then we will be there through the changeover at midnight on the 1st of July, which is the official time of turnover. This group is going—I think there are six senators on the group now and about eight House members. We'll be going to represent the U.S. and the U.S. Congress at this historic occasion. It has no big diplomatic purpose, other than that—just a courtesy of one government to another. [U.S. Secretary of State] Madeline Albright will be there. She'll be the official representative representing the President, as such, out of the administration.

There are some problems with this, and that's the reason I wanted to record this a little bit. Madeline's intent at the moment is to attend the swearing-in of Tung Chee-Wah, who is going to be the new head of Hong Kong representing the Chinese government in Beijing. Now, he is a big Hong Kong businessman, very

wealthy, and he's going to be the leader in that area for Beijing.

Now, the other thing that's developed over the last few years is that Britain has tried to develop more democracy in Hong Kong. A little late, I would say, after 140 years of just rule, although they did a good job, administered Hong Kong well, brought health and education and all those things that China did not have, and made it a real business center. So I'm not that critical of the Brits. But I am critical that they suddenly get this idea of democracy at the last moment, in the last eight or nine years, just before they're going to leave.

Part of that process was to set up an elective Legislative Council. It's been quite popular in Hong Kong and it was hoped that this would continue over after the Chinese takeover. The Chinese are going to continue the Leg Council, but not with the current membership, and only with the people that they are appointing to the Leg Council. Now, we don't agree with that, but it seems to me that we're not doing right to go down there, to be there as a courtesy during this switchover, and then make a big fuss about that. What the State Department is doing, and I presume with the President's okay, is, Madeline Albright, right now, at least, is planning to be there and attend the swearing-in of Tung Chee-Wah, C.H. Tung, he's known as. He's known as C.H. more commonly out there—be there for the swearing-in of C.H. Then that ceremony will be followed by a ceremony in which the new Legislative Council will be sworn in, and she is planning to leave and boycott that because we disagree with it.

Now, the question is, if we go down there representing the Senate of the

United States, do we go and do that same thing, which I see as sort of an affront to the Chinese government, a little slap at them that's unnecessary during all this high ceremony period. Knowing full well they will undoubtedly slap back at us with some sort of little slight later on? Or, do we go and be there for the swearing-in of whatever and act as I think we should act?

I've expressed this to some of our group that is going, and I think most of them agree with me. But whether we will feel that it is best not to differentiate ourselves from the administration, I don't know. But I want to keep emphasizing as much as I can the things that have worked out well with the Chinese government, not where we're always at odds with each other.

As I talked to Jiang Zemin on the trip out there last November, we have thirty-some projects through eleven U.S. agencies and departments of government that have been in effect since 1979, working very well—water projects and soil and fertilizer and all sorts of studies and things, health matters. I keep emphasizing those things out there. I'm as much for human rights as anybody else, but I think when we let our emphasis on human rights have the potential of upsetting all the other things that have gone on that were good, we'd better be careful. If we are to take this attitude on human rights as strongly as we are, then if we're consistent, then we probably will have to take actions in a similar way against probably half the nations of the world we deal with that do not have our own version of civil rights.

Anyway, I just wanted to get that in as a preface to our going to Hong

Kong this coming weekend. When we come back, we can talk about Hong Kong more and what that was like. I think it's going to be a very interesting trip.

If people really feel honestly that we should boycott parts of what we're going there to do, then I question whether I really want to go. So I guess I have to make that decision before the end of this week.

[End of interview]