

The John H. Glenn, Jr.  
Oral History Project

Oral History Interview 6

with  
John H. Glenn, Jr.

in the Hart Office Building  
in Washington, D.C.

February 7, 1997

Brien R. Williams  
Interviewer

[Begin Interview 6, Tape 1, Side A]

WILLIAMS: This is the sixth interview with Senator Glenn. It is taking place in the Hart Office Building. It is February 7, 1997. I'm Brien Williams.

You were mentioning to me just a moment ago about the circumstances when you first heard about Pearl Harbor. Tell me that story.

SEN. GLENN: I remember that very well, because Annie had an organ recital scheduled. She was a music major at Muskingum and it was in her senior year, and sometime during that year they had to have a major recital. She was scheduled for a Sunday afternoon. Annie and I had been going with each other ever since we were in high school and through college, and planned to be married as soon as we were out of college.

I was driving up toward the campus, toward Brown Chapel, which is

where the recital was to be. As I was driving along Main Street in New Concord, getting ready to turn left up College Drive to go up on the campus, there was a break-in on the radio broadcast. It was a news broadcast about things that had happened that day. I went on up and parked in front of the chapel, and sat out there for a little while listening to this broadcast, and then went in. I didn't tell Annie anything about this before her organ recital.

But I can remember to this day exactly where I sat in the chapel. If you're looking down from the platform, I'd be a little over on the right side. I did some very heavy thinking that day, I guess, and that evening we talked about it a lot. I knew what I had to do, I thought at that time, and then volunteered a short time later. I would add, the organ recital was outstanding. She was very good.

WILLIAMS: When you say you discussed it, was it just with her, or did you immediately go to your parents, too, and talk it over with them?

SEN. GLENN: I talked it over first with Annie, I think. The parents were very interested in all this, of course. When I did talk to my parents, I think it was probably the next day, or within a couple of days, the question was whether I would remain in college and graduate—this was in the middle of my junior year—and then go into the military, if that was to be the case, or whether I would go immediately. I think they sort of favored the waiting a little while, as any parents, I guess, probably would. But I thought it was important to get going.

At the end of the semester, I left college and had signed up, and then early that spring was sent for flight training. One little background to

this, though, was back in my sophomore year in college, there was a program then called the Civilian Pilot Training, CPT. That program was paid for by the government, but you also got college physics credit for this. I thought that was too good to miss, because I had never had any idea that I might be able to afford flight training or actually get my license, and this was a way to do it and get college credit for it at the same time, because we were studying aerodynamics and heat transfer and engines and things like that.

So I signed up for that and went through and had my private pilot's license then and had probably, oh, I suppose, fifty or sixty hours, maybe sixty-five hours when World War II broke out at the time of Pearl Harbor. So having that background, I went into aviation and military flight training.

WILLIAMS: When you heard the announcement over the radio, first of all, were you half expecting that, or did that just come directly out of the blue?

SEN. GLENN: We knew there was a lot of tension in the world. The war in Europe had been going on, of course, and we were all concerned about that. I think there was a general feeling that we might be involved with that over there. But I don't think most people, including any of us who were students and not in on any inside information, certainly, none of us really anticipated that there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor. That was almost unthinkable. Pearl Harbor was a bastion of military strength, about which

I knew practically nothing at that time as a student in college. But we knew we had major naval forces in the Pacific, of course.

To think that the Japanese would have the audacity to attack American territory and American forces was something I think most people had thought would be impossible. It wasn't even thinkable, and yet they did it. So that caused a lot of people to reassess their lives and what they were going to do and their responsibilities. I guess, as a student in the middle of my junior year, I was one of them.

WILLIAMS: Was it being reported when you were listening on the radio, before going into the chapel, in hysterical terms at point? Were you hearing news as it was breaking?

SEN. GLENN: Well, pretty much. There were news reports of what the attack had been that morning. I don't recall all the details of it now, but I remember they were assessing what had happened, how many people had been killed, what kind of damage there had been, what kind of ship loss there had been. Of course, it was what, the next day, or two days after that, that President [Franklin D.] Roosevelt made his "day that will live in infamy" speech. Of course, by that time there was a lot more known about it.

WILLIAMS: With your friends in college, particularly the other guys, prior to Pearl Harbor, was there a lot of discussion about this, or was that something that was sort of going on outside your own...

SEN. GLENN: Oh, prior to Pearl Harbor it was something that was going on outside our realm.

Not outside our realm of interest, because I think most people felt—we were not going to be surprised if we got involved in the war in Europe. There had been a lot of talk about that. But we didn't discuss this much in college or anything. We were all involved with our daily activities and studies and sports and all the things that everybody's interested in, dating and all the things people are interested in at college, that are pretty much confined to the campus.

WILLIAMS: My impression is that World War I had been really just a horrendous war. Your father had been involved in some of the major battles and that grim, muddy, horrible battlefield that didn't change for months.

SEN. GLENN: Yes.

WILLIAMS: I guess the simple way to ask that question is, anyone who lived through that experience, why didn't they become lifelong pacifists?

SEN. GLENN: Well, it was a horrible experience. Some of my most vivid memories of childhood, as a matter of fact, are the times when my dad would get telling about some of his experiences in World War I, which he did not do on a regular basis. He wasn't a professional World War I vet, like some of the people were, who couldn't wait to get up and talk about their experiences, even at that later date when I was growing up. But he was very proud of service to his country. Very proud.

He'd get going talking about different experiences they had had. It's interesting, looking back on it, that most of the experiences that he would talk about were funny things that happened between he and the other people. He was

part of the Ohio 37th Division, which had been activated, and volunteered to go with them, trained at Montgomery, Alabama, and then left directly from there. He and my mother were married just before he left to go overseas.

His specialty area that he was in was on what was called an ammunition train at that time, which was caissons, horse-drawn caissons, that kept taking artillery shells, supplied the big artillery shells for the front and all the artillery exchanges they had with the Germans at that time. As a matter of fact, his ears were damaged. He was by an artillery piece one day, too close to it, and it went off and he didn't know it was going to happen, and it damaged his ears. So he had to wear a hearing aid all of his life. He had his ears damaged by World War I.

But he was very proud of his service, and I think growing up in a community like New Concord where patriotism was just assumed, it wasn't something that people debated. You were either patriotic or you'd practically be run out of town, I guess. It was that kind of community. My dad was always a member of the American Legion and was active in their activities. Some of my greatest memories are of him talking about some of his experiences in World War I.

WILLIAMS: You've explained pretty well your training and then shipping out to the Pacific.

There were just a couple of things I wanted to go over there. You mention in your diary that that trip to Hawaii on the *Santa Monica* was a kind of grueling experience. Can you go into a little detail there?

SEN. GLENN: Yes, I sure could. The *Santa Monica*, as I remember, was a converted banana

boat that used to ply in the coastal trade between the United States and South America, or Panama, bringing big boatloads of bananas back and forth. They had the racks and the holds and all that sort of thing. They had converted this thing and put decks in all of these holds, where they used to have bananas, and tried to put in some ventilation and stack the—they weren't berths, they were just racks of canvas, a place to lie down. These were only something like eighteen inches apart. So you stacked a lot of people up like that and there was not adequate ventilation. The heads in the sanitary facilities, they were there, but they were dirty and overrun. It was not a very pleasant experience.

Food was not all that great. I think after trying to sleep down there the first night—it was my tendency towards seasickness anyway—I think I spent most of the rest of the trip up on topside. We would take our blankets and go up there, and if it wasn't raining, we'd stay up there and spend the time up there.

I remember, too, there was another factor. When we first left San Diego, headed toward a war zone, I thought, well, we're out here where the submarines are going to be. We had an escort ship that went with us for, I think, maybe the first day or something like that, it wasn't beyond that, and then left. So there we were going across toward Hawaii. It wasn't a convoy; it was a single ship. We talked about that some.

I guess their theory at that time was that the Japanese were using their submarines back closer to home against American ships out there. They had made the assessment that we didn't really need an escort to go to Hawaii at that

time. But I remember when we didn't have our escort, I thought this was a little bit surprising. I think it was like a five-day or six-day trip to Hawaii at that time, something like that. I think they thought that this boat was fast enough that it could go faster than the submarines could cruise. I guess that's another reason they thought it was safe to go the way we did.

WILLIAMS: This was your first experience with ocean travel.

SEN. GLENN: Very first experience. I'd never been at sea before. I had seen the ocean, but that was about it. I had never been out on the Pacific Ocean, of course. I had seen it, because we were stationed there in California for training. But before going out there, I'd never been to the Pacific coast. I'd seen the Atlantic Ocean up around New York.

We went to Cherry Point for training, after I got out of flight school. That was the first time I had ever lived anyplace, even though it was for a short period of time, where you could actually look out across the Atlantic Ocean and think, you know, next stop is Portugal, or next spot is Africa, or whatever.

WILLIAMS: I remember the first time I took an oceangoing voyage, I asked myself, how am I going to be affected? Am I going to get sick? I guess you were doing the same thing, and discovered, to your horror, that you would.

SEN. GLENN: Well, I got seasick. I'm a very peculiar person, I guess, in that I'm not prone to airsickness. I've never really gotten sick to the vomit point in air travel. Bouncing around in the back end of a hot-temperature transport or something like that sometimes, I've gotten a little squeamish. But I do get seasick. I get out,

particularly on a destroyer or something like that, with these long rolls that they make back and forth. Or like the USS *Santa Monica* made, the old converted banana boat, on the way to Hawaii, I was seasick on that. I missed quite a few meals on that trip.

WILLIAMS: You were traveling with members of your own squadron at that point?

SEN. GLENN: Yes, that's right. They had two ways of sending people overseas. Sometimes if there was an existing squadron overseas, they would send people out as replacements to go into that squadron and relieve people to come back. But fairly often at that stage, early in the war, they'd be sending out a whole new squadron. As such, you'd train in the States, train together, went out together. Usually picked up your new airplanes at Pearl Harbor. You didn't take all your equipment with you. You'd pick up your airplanes and equipment at Pearl Harbor and go on out into the combat zone. That's what we were doing.

We had trained not only at Kerney Mesa, but also in El Centro, for a good part of 1943. Then went as a squadron, all of our personnel and personal equipment, to Hawaii, where we were to pick up our equipment.

WILLIAMS: You described coming into Midway, I guess, for the first time. You traveled from Hawaii to Midway by air, is that correct?

SEN. GLENN: Yes.

WILLIAMS: You describe it as a kind of tent city.

SEN. GLENN: Well, no, not Midway. Tent city later, down in the Marshall Islands. But Midway had Quonset huts and there were two islands. One was Eastern Island

and Sand Island, where we were. There was an airfield there and there had been a squadron out there training a short time before. We relieved them. The reason we were sent out there was because the move into the Marshall Islands that we were to be part of was put back for a few months. Since we were just arriving in Hawaii, they sent us on out to Midway then to train for a month or two until they were ready to send us down to the Marshalls. And that's what we did.

We went out to Midway and we flew out there and some of the other pilots flew the planes out. We had Corsairs that we had picked up in Hawaii, and some of them picked those, took those airplanes out. I was in the group that flew out on one of the transport airplanes. But then we trained out there at Midway and did aerial gunnery practice and bombing practice and things like that off the island. The Battle of Midway, the famous Battle of Midway, had been sometime before. I don't remember the exact time of it, but it was like, oh, I guess, in late '42, something like that. So we arrived out there at the end of '43, I guess it would be.

WILLIAMS: You mentioned that you had a rivalry with another squadron, Fighters 313.

SEN. GLENN: No, not 313, I don't think.

WILLIAMS: No? I thought I picked that up in your diary, rivalry with VMF-313 at Midway.

SEN. GLENN: No, there was another—no, I think there's something. I don't recall that one at all.

WILLIAMS: I'll check that.

SEN. GLENN: Yes, might want to check that, because we were the only squadron out there when we first arrived. Well, no, wait, there was another—there was a squadron

that was just leaving as we got there. I think that was it. I don't recall if there was any—I'll have to look that one up.

WILLIAMS: Okay. Then after your stint in Midway, you returned to Hawaii for a while.

SEN. GLENN: Came back to Hawaii.

WILLIAMS: And that's where you met up with the Chois [phonetic], the Korean family?

SEN. GLENN: Met them, yes. I don't recall what the connection was there.

WILLIAMS: Okay. Well, they were talking about their treatment, the treatment of Koreans by the Japanese.

SEN. GLENN: Yes. Where did I meet them, though? I don't remember where I...

WILLIAMS: Well, I thought somewhere in Hawaii.

SEN. GLENN: I think it was Hawaii.

WILLIAMS: They were living in Hawaii, shopkeepers or something.

SEN. GLENN: They were. I met them, and I think they invited several of us to their home and we were there and talked about things. I think that's where they talked about how some of the Korean people had been treated by the Japanese, which was anything but good.

WILLIAMS: Because up to this point you had had no contact with Japanese, or had you?

SEN. GLENN: No. I didn't know any Japanese. Never met any Japanese or Koreans, as far as that goes.

WILLIAMS: No Japanese or Oriental students at Muskingum?

SEN. GLENN: No. At that time, Muskingum was pretty much—you'd call it pretty much WASP, White Anglo-Saxon Protestant, with very few other ethnic groups

represented.

WILLIAMS: What about sake bars in San Diego or something? That was not where you and Annie hung out?

SEN. GLENN: No, not usually. We went to different restaurants in San Diego. You've got to remember that the Japanese on the West Coast, most of them had been interred by that time. They were out in camps by that time. We can argue now how right or wrong it was, but it was surely accepted at that time, because there were all sorts of rumors about what kind of connections they had and what kind of subterfuge there might be from their activities in support of Japan.

As we know now, most of that was absolute fiction, and most of those people were just as loyal—almost all of them were just as loyal Americans as anyone else. We've talked about this in more recent years to people like Senator [Daniel K.] Inouye here, and Senator Matzanaga [phonetic], who has since died, but who went into some of those outfits where there were Japanese-Americans that were put into combat in Italy and places like that. That was as tough combat as anyone went into. Danny lost an arm, of course, in combat over there. While they were over there fighting, many of their relatives had been tossed into prison camps here or detention camps here. We view that as being wrong, and it was wrong at the time, though. With all the uncertainties of a new major global war on our hands, people weren't taking any chances.

WILLIAMS: Along that line, then, during your service in the Pacific, did you ever see Japanese? You weren't taking prisoners obviously. What about that? They were

just an unseen enemy?

SEN. GLENN: No, we saw Japanese in Hawaii when we were there, of course. But as far as out in combat, we were doing aerial combat and there were no Japanese or Japanese prisoners on the islands where we were based. We were going over and hitting other islands. So we had no personal contact with the Japanese.

WILLIAMS: What about your contacts with the native people in the islands?

SEN. GLENN: They were very little. Most of the natives, when bases were put in, or when an air base was established, any natives that were on that island were moved over to another island. These atolls were rings of coral islands that had been around a former volcanic base, so you had a big lagoon and then around this would be smaller islands, palm tree islands. That's where the natives were. We never went back and forth to those islands.

The only time I ever had any direct contact with natives, other than just workers that they had hired to do work on the base and runways and things like that, we saw some of those people, but was down when we were at Tarawa. This was sometime after the Battle of Tarawa. We were using Tarawa as a staging base to go out and hit a small island about four hundred miles west of there called Nauru, which was a long flight out there.

But down there, while we were waiting in that area, there were some weather delays for the flights that we were to make. We went over one time, they took us over, a whole bunch of us, over to a native village, where we went over and we bought some little trinkets and shell beads and things like that, that they

made. I believe that's the only time we had direct contact with the natives out of all the time we were out there. They were segregated on different islands and we were doing our job off the island where our airplanes were. That was pretty much it.

Now, I know in some of the other places—I think that was the pattern for people out in the islands where there were atolls. Now, places like down at Guadalcanal and places where people were still occupying the same major island, there may have been more contact with the natives, but there was very little out in the central Pacific.

WILLIAMS: You've mentioned the gooney birds.

SEN. GLENN: Yes.

WILLIAMS: Did you have other encounters with spiders or snakes or anything like that?

SEN. GLENN: No. The islands we were on were mainly sand-based, coral sand. We would go out and do some snorkeling out around coral heads in the lagoon, and so you'd see all sorts of fish and rays and octopus. That was the first time I'd ever seen an octopus was out there. We had things like that, that were a little bit strange and wondrous, that we hadn't seen before. But as far as the jungle living that was so unpleasant for troops down farther to the southwest, Guadalcanal and the Solomons and those areas, we had none of those problems at all. We were on what would be looked at now as beautiful tourist islands, palm trees ringing a beautiful sandy beach. There was some of that. There also was a lot of rocky area also. But Midway had some beautiful sandy beaches, as did the Marshall Islands

when we got down there.

WILLIAMS: Contrast, then, Midway to the Marshalls. What were the differences?

SEN. GLENN: Main difference would be just in the climate, I guess. Midway was a little colder, it was farther north. It was a colder island when we were out there. The weather was colder. When you got down in the Marshall Islands, it was a very tropical-type weather. You would have rainstorms that lasted—maybe once in a great while you'd have a rainstorm that would last for a day. But the average day down in the Marshall Islands, it would dawn pretty clear in the morning, as the day went on there would be a few little puffy clouds build up, and by late afternoon you might have an afternoon rainstorm. It would clear and that was pretty much it. That was the average-type day.

We usually tried to get our flights off and do our flying in the morning early, when the weather would not be a factor. We were usually successful in doing that. Once in a while squadrons would get trapped out by weather. I think it was VMF Marine Fighter Squadron 421, or maybe it was 441, that lost a whole squadron in weather, where they had to go off course, couldn't get through, landed at sea off an island and lost some of the pilots trying to get ashore across a coral reef where the waves were banging.

A friend of mine named Moran—I think we talked about this a little bit before—was one of the pilots killed trying to get ashore. So when we were at Midway, the general ordered we would have training to enable us to better come to shore if we had to do that. They took us out in a whale boat and dumped us off

out beyond the surf and we had to inflate our little dinghies and get in them and come ashore across that coral area. That was a rather testy experience. I remember that training very, very well.

WILLIAMS: So it was in the Marshalls that you described things as like a tent city.

SEN. GLENN: Yes, the Marshalls were. We lived in tents, although we built Quonset huts there, too. We moved into tents first there. Then in the Marshalls we built our own Quonset huts, but at Kwajalein, which we moved to later in our overseas tour, we literally had a tent city, and the only Quonset hut we had was the mess hall where we went to eat, where we ate. At Kwajalein, our tent that Tom Miller and Dick Rainforth and I had was built down fairly close to the water, so that at the highest tides each month the water actually would come up and wash over under our hut into a little low area behind us.

We got our fresh water by putting a little trough where it ran off the tent and collect that in a barrel, and all the things you've seen in some of these South Pacific movie—the washing machine, the little wind-driven washing machine. Or another way we did to wash clothes sometimes was, you tie a little bundle of clothes, of shirts and pants together, and tie a little rope around them very tight, and take them out and just tie them to a coral head. You let the waves come in and wash back and forth, saltwater, wash back and forth across them for a day. Bring them back in, wash them out in the fresh water, or hang them out on the line and let the rainstorm that came in almost every afternoon, just let that do the rinsing, and let them dry out. That was a fine laundry.

I remember it was very unusual. I remember, after we'd been out there for a number of months, how unusual it was to see anybody coming through on one of the airplanes going through that had starched shirts or pants, because we were accustomed at that time, you just put them out, you cleaned them, when they were clean you didn't worry about anything else. That's the way you wore them. When you came back to Hawaii, either for R&R, it was—I wouldn't say it was shocking, but you sure noticed that here's everybody with starched shirts on back here, which we didn't have out there.

WILLIAMS: You have at home an oral history by a man by the name of Jarotta [phonetic]?

SEN. GLENN: John Jarotto.

WILLIAMS: Can you tell me the episode there? You were involved when he went down, is that true?

SEN. GLENN: I was, but that was in Korea. That was in the Korean War later on.

WILLIAMS: I'm sorry. That's right.

SEN. GLENN: Yes, that was in the summer of 1953. It's about ten years later, or nine years later, yes.

WILLIAMS: I'm sorry, that was my error. All of your flying in the Pacific in Corsairs?

SEN. GLENN: Yes. Right. Well, let me say, we flew a couple of other airplanes, but not in combat. There was one time where there was a squadron and they had transferred the people and they left all their airplanes behind because of weather or something. They wanted us to ferry them up to another island. So after we had done our combat mission for whatever that day was, we checked out in those

airplanes one day and then flew them something like four hundred miles over open ocean to a different island the next day, and then transport brought us back. So we did fly a couple of other types of aircraft, but all of our combat missions were in the Corsairs.

WILLIAMS: You mentioned somewhere that you had flown some F-6s and they were pretty disappointing.

SEN. GLENN: F-6Fs, yes. That was when we first got to the Marshalls and one of the squadrons that had been there had left their airplanes. They wanted us to use them as supplementary to our Corsairs. So we checked out in the F-6F, and almost everybody in our squadron, I think, agreed with my assessment that while it was a good airplane and it was good for carriers because it was very easy to bring aboard ship, but we'd much rather have the Corsair. It was faster, carried a bigger load, better airplane.

[Begin Tape 1, Side 2]

SEN. GLENN: Part of our training from time to time would be to go to higher altitudes than we normally cruised at. Normally, when you went on a mission you'd fly at eight or ten thousand feet, maybe twelve thousand, something like that. Above that, though, you required oxygen and the airplane would go way above that. We never knew when we might get put in a position where we'd have to go to higher altitudes because of combat, if we were transferred to a different island or different combat theater. So we would do what we called oxygen hops once in a

while, which went up to the higher altitudes.

The old Corsair, if you went into the second stage of supercharger, which you could, I think we got it up to about thirty-two or thirty-three thousand feet, something like that, which is very, very high for a prop plane. We weren't doing combat up there, and all of our work in the Marshalls, we did no actual combat flying at that altitude.

Some of the people earlier in the war down at Guadalcanal had gone up because the Japanese would come flying over at high altitude with their bombers and a high enough altitude that sometimes our people had trouble getting up to them.

I remember one story, I wasn't there when this happened, but it shows the kind of intensity or how people got so dedicated to making war at one time or another. There had been an airplane come down, which was at high altitude, that bombed some of the areas there in the Solomon Islands area. I think it was a basically night flight, that would come down almost every night and drop a few bombs at night. I think this was the flight. They nicknamed him "Bed Check Charlie."

They were determined to get that airplane. One of the people in a Corsair was up and saw the airplane and had trouble getting up to it. They were up like thirty thousand feet, or thirty-two thousand, something like that. He was chasing this airplane, couldn't quite get up to it, finally got up to it, got right on the tail and tried to fire, and his guns would not fire. What they found out later, when the

planes were up there and had been up there long enough for the guns to get cold that you were in such a low temperature up there that guns with any grease on them, it was just congealed. It was thick. So if you're going to fight at altitude, you had to take guns up there that were basically dry, with very little lubrication on them.

Anyway, his guns would not fire and he was so determined to get this airplane that he pulled up behind it and actually used his prop to cut off the tail of the airplane, knowing full well that if it didn't go right, he would go down. But he got the airplane okay and made two passes at it and came up and nibbled the whole control surface off the tail, damaged his own airplane. So his own props were not working right at all, own prop was not working right, and managed to get the airplane back. There was a picture of it I saw not long ago showing him standing there in front of the airplane with the damaged prop. So he actually rammed the other airplane.

There was another one like that that I knew, a friend of mind, Jack Conger. He was down at Guadalcanal flying the old F-4F, the Wildcat. They tell a story about him where he was scissoring back and forth with a Japanese Zero. They were trying to outdo each other and fire as they went by each time and scissor to get an advantage. He finally ran out of ammunition on the next pass when they went by, and he pulled up and actually rammed the tail of the other airplane. They both bailed out. Neither one of them was killed when their planes hit like that. They both bailed out and came down by parachute.

When the whale boat came out from the shore to pick them up, they picked up Jack first, and the Japanese pilot was over not too far away. They picked Jack up and went over in a whale boat to pick up the Japanese pilot, and Jack reached over the side to get hold of him and pull him up into the whale boat, and the fellow pulled out a pistol and pointed it right in Jack's face and pulled the trigger. And it clicked and the shell didn't go off. So his story was, he used a gaff hook then to get him in and they brought him back and had him as a prisoner in the stockade there. That was down off Guadalcanal.

I tell those two stories just to illustrate the mentality of people in that type situation. You're in a situation where you're going to do that job and you're going to do it no matter what. If your own life is out there on the line, so be it, but you're going to get it. That's a typical fighter pilot attitude, of a good fighter pilot. Most fighter pilots are trained to the point where they feel they really are the best thing in the air, the most capable people in the air. If they don't, that may be a bit egotistic, but any fighter pilot, real fighter pilot, that doesn't believe that he's about as good or better than anybody else in the air had better get out of the business, because you need that kind of an attitude when you're going into combat, or you're liable to get bagged yourself.

WILLIAMS: If you were sitting around with some other pilots telling your best tales to prove that point, what would yours be?

SEN. GLENN: Oh, I suppose most of those would come later in the Korean War where we did do some things there that, looking back on it, were pretty dangerous things to do

because we were dedicated to what we were trying to do.

WILLIAMS: Let's leave that for then. But anything from your experiences you were—your plane was damaged several times, right?

SEN. GLENN: The plane was damaged. I never had any big hits that blew great chunks off the airplane in World War II. I had holes and multiple holes in the airplane. Only once was there an explosive shell hit, and that was on the leading edge of the left wing. It didn't damage the controls. It was lucky that it did not set a fire in the wing tanks, but it didn't. That was the one that was very serious damage. The other four times I was hit in World War II were either multiple holes through the airplane, or a couple of them were just single holes.

But in Korea later on, there were some things there where we had to make decisions about whether you're going to get back or bail out and some things like that that I think we could get into later.

WILLIAMS: This is one of my favorite questions. Can you describe a typical day in the Marshalls?

SEN. GLENN: Oh, typical day. When we were first living in tents, we first got there and then built our own Quonset huts. We had a canvas cot. You usually had maybe an old egg crate or an orange crate or something, as a place standing by your bunk to put things on, as sort of a little side table. Or you'd get some old chunks of two-by-four, or a packing case or something, and put it there. We had bunks lined up just in a row down a Quonset hut.

Toilet facilities were outside and down the road a ways. A picture I saw

not long ago reminded me of somebody was asking, "What were they?" About a three- or four-inch pipe driven into the ground at an angle with a funnel on the end of it. Well, those are places where you urinated. Those were all around the place. But the place where you actually had the toilets and things like that, which would be a different thing as far as smell and so on goes, you wanted to get away from the camp. So those were down a little ways away.

We did most of the time have electricity from some of these portable generators, so you had some lights in there. Where we were in the Marshalls, we weren't in a situation where you had to be in complete blackout all the time at night. So we could use those generators and have some light in the Quonset hut until a certain hour in the evening.

But when you got up in the morning, you had showers outside where you had bags of water hoisted up, then a thing that you could just use a little bit of water, and get yourself all wet, and then take what we used to call a Navy bath. I guess it was Navy and Marine Corps bath. You'd suds up then, then only turn the water on again when you wanted to rinse off. So you do that.

If we had a mission scheduled, you'd go eat. Usually wherever we were, we had a Quonset hut as a mess area, feeding area. The food at that time, they had just gotten into dehydrated foods in some depth, so we'd have dehydrated potatoes maybe, or powdered egg. There were very few fresh things at that time. Very little meat. Spam was a regular order of the day. One of our chief cooks in the squadron, in 155, was very, very creative with how he would fix Spam up. I

never did get sick of Spam. I like Spam to this day. But he would bake it as meatloaf and he would make patties out of it and he would mix it up in soup like chili. He would do all sorts of things with it. There was one period, I think we figured out once out there, it was like five months or something like that, that we had never had any fresh meat in the five-month period. But we did very well and we didn't think that much about it.

They had flour. I remember one time at the end of our flour supply, which they baked fresh bread out of every two or three days, the weevils had gotten into that. When we first started having slices of bread that had little black specks in them, people sort of picked them out, and went ahead and ate the bread. But after a while you didn't even bother picking them out. You had plenty of peanut butter and jam and things like that, and you figured it'd been baked, and nobody paid any attention to them. So there were things like that that were a little different than dining at the Ritz. But, in general, we ate pretty well.

At that time they had developed some of this reconstituted milk. It's not bad now, but at that time the reconstituted milk wasn't all that great. We drank it. We had a lot of canned fruit juice and canned juices and things like that. So I guess we had what would be a healthy diet.

Typical day, let's see, beyond the eating, you'd probably go brief for a flight. If possible, we tried to get off before the weather would come up with the afternoon cumulus clouds. You'd probably try and get that off at 9:00 or 9:30 in the morning, something like that, if possible, or you varied the time so they

weren't always expecting you at a certain time. We would brief for that.

We would have intelligence briefings. If there were pictures, if we had some overhead photos, which you didn't have many of back in those days unless you sent your own reconnaissance plane out to take advance pictures, which we had a few of. You had maps. We'd go through the navigation, because we had none of the electronic navigation that you have today. It was dead-reckoning navigation. You had a plot board. So everybody sat with their plot board, and during a briefing you'd put all the data on the plot board that you're going to need during the flight.

You'd have different call signs, different code names for different flights within the squadron. You'd have emergency information of what frequencies you would come up on if you wanted to Dumbo, Dumbo being the flying boat that trailed along way, way behind in case somebody went down and they needed to come in and make an open-ocean landing to pick them up, if possible, if the seas would permit.

So you had all those frequencies on there. But the main thing you concentrated on was your navigational information. So that if you were split off for any reason, if you couldn't rejoin as a squadron to come home, that you could make it home okay on your own and had all your own navigation data. This was done on the basis of holding very precise compass headings and holding a very specific air speed. With that, then, you could calculate by making your wind estimates, and you had a plotting board to make your wind estimates. So you

could estimate your ground speed and that then gave you not only your correction with the wind to get home, but your correction gave you the ground speed to give you the distance and the time. And that's the way you navigated. You spent a lot of time briefing, doing that.

Then you'd go out to fly the mission. Everyone would start up at the same time. The squadron CO would give the signal to start up, everybody would watch down the flight line, and when he fired up, then everybody starting firing up. You'd taxi out and sometimes we'd take off—not just single planes—take off with one plane flying wing on another taking off. So you'd do two-plane takeoffs, so you'd get the squadron in the air faster that way.

The leader then would go out, way out off the end of the runway, continue a straight course, until he had timed it that the last plane was off. Just before that last plane was off, he'd reverse course, or turn toward whatever our course was to go toward our target. That way then all the other planes would cut across. Or he would pick them up coming back toward the island. You had the whole squadron together, and off you went.

Sometimes we'd go on a low-altitude strafing mission, where once you got to the island you would fly along and planes would peel off one after the other and go down on strafing missions. Or you had bombs, if you did that, you were probably going to come in higher and come in a fairly steep dive with the landing gear down to act as dive breaks to slow you, so you didn't go too fast, and come down. That, of course, is what we had practiced day in and day out during all of

our training.

We didn't have any of the automatic equipment you have now, where you can put a laser spot on and the bomb homes on it and all that. This was strictly plain old dumb bombs like they had had for many years. You had to use your fixed gun sight up there and actually figure the wind coming down and give enough lead on the target correction on where you're put the pipper over here off the target, so that you compensated for wind and for your dive angle and for your speed.

There's as much art to that as there is science. You get sort of the "combat eye," if you will, for making an attack like that. You get that only by practice day in, day out, day in, day out. We had done that hundreds and hundreds of times. We had made runs like that, usually dropping little two-pound mini bombs that had a shotgun shell in them so it would make a smoke when it hit. You'd look back, once you had made a practice run like that, you could tell how far off you had been, and gradually you get to where you get pretty good at being able to drop a bigger bomb than that had that same trajectory as the two-pound mini.

So we'd go out and you'd make maybe a high run like that coming in on target and turn and jinx coming out, so you make a number of turns and don't keep the same altitude and maneuver around somewhat coming out, so that they can't draw a bead on you as easily with antiaircraft fire. Then come off the island and go to whatever the designated rendezvous point was. It might be ten miles east of the island south, or it would be five miles north of something or another. But you

designated it, and all planes came out to that point then for two purposes, not only to help navigation home, but to find out if everybody was still with us or not.

So that would be sort of a typical run. A typical run in the Marshalls then meant a lot of antiaircraft fire. No airplanes, but a lot of antiaircraft fire. The Japanese had left thousands of people in there and all kinds of antiaircraft and plenty of ammunition. So we were jousting with antiaircraft all the time, and that was the main concern.

Low-altitude runs were different where you came in right on top of the trees. We were using .50-caliber machine guns and each Corsair had six of those, three in each wing. Or in the latter part of our tour out there, we started using napalm. On that we used to call them a "nape scrape." What that meant, you were just flying at the target, when you get so low you're going to scrape it off, why, you'd drop the tank and pull up and that's it. "Nape scrape" was a common phrase there and in the Korean War later on.

There is not the same kind of sighting problem there. You can't come in high and drop a napalm bomb and get the same kind of accuracy you need. On a "nape scrape" you always came in and just flew at the target. When you flew at it and when you had to pull up to keep from hitting it, why, you dropped your tank and it spread out and that was that. So we did a lot of that, particularly in areas where you thought that there were a lot of people. It sounds hideous to say, but war is war, and that's what you were after. You were trying to beat down the enemy forces.

We did a considerable amount, a number of attacks on fortified positions, on areas where you knew they had their ammunition stored and concrete reinforced block houses and things like that. They were a little hard to get into, because they were built to take a bomb blast of a regular general purpose bomb. So we sometimes would drop armor-piercing 500-pounders, which had a long needle steel nose on it, which would go through concrete and reinforced concrete block house construction and get into the ammunition that was stored inside.

If you made an attack and you hit a block house like that, you would see the burst of your own bomb. But then when you really knew you had done something good was when you'd start getting a secondary explosion. You'd have maybe one or two bangs come out of there and you knew you had gotten into the ammunition supply inside. That was considered quite a coop. That was something you really reported back to the intelligence briefing at the end of the flight.

To carry this day on through here, when you came back and landed, you always had an intelligence debriefing as to what people had seen. Were the briefings ahead of time accurate? Have you seen any new antiaircraft positions firing? What was the status of repair on things that we might have hit before? All the things you'd want to know on debriefing.

Then usually by that time it would be afternoon. We usually did not have two strikes in one day. We were not under any danger of attack or anything, so the afternoons were quite often spent out on the beach or playing volleyball or

snorkeling in the lagoon or writing letters or reading, doing whatever you wanted to do.

Sometimes at night, out under open palm trees would be a movie projector. Movies had been sent in. You would sit on coconut logs that had just been sawed off at about eighteen-inch or twenty-inch height and those were the seats and they'd have line-ups of these chunks of logs. When we went to the movies at night, you went with your poncho and your tropical helmet, and likely as not there'd be a rain shower sometime during the movie. All you did was put your poncho on, your helmet, and just continue the movie. That was that. Wasn't much entertainment outside of that. But that was pretty good for a war. They didn't have it that good in some other areas, so we felt rather fortunate.

WILLIAMS: This was a community of about how many men? Were you working with other squadrons or not?

SEN. GLENN: When we first went out to the Marshalls in Majuro [Atoll] we were the only squadron operating there. I suppose our total squadron complement, including pilots and mechanics, and just everybody connected with the squadron, I suppose we had maybe 400 people, 350 or 400 people, I would guess. I don't recall the exact number, but I would guess it was probably that number.

On other islands, though—we were at Majuro and then we came up and were based at Roi-Namur, which is a north island on the bigger atoll of Kwajalein. Kwajalein is quite a large atoll and a huge lagoon. The lagoon, I don't know, must be fifty miles long or something like that. Very, very large. Up there we did

some coordinated attacks then with other squadrons, where we'd have two, or I think sometimes three squadrons went out on specific strikes.

Up there, that was where we really started using napalm in big quantity for the first time. One of those napalm strikes, usually the squadron CO, Pete Haines, he was at that time, would lead the mission. There was one time when he and the—I remember it because it put a lot of confidence in me. But he was gone someplace when we had reached Roi-Namur. He had had to go to some commanding officers' meeting or something that day. Our executive officer still hadn't come yet. He was coming with the last contingent that was moving.

Pete picked me to lead the mission and told me to do it, and I did. Led the whole squadron. That was quite an experience, because I think at that time I was a captain, I guess, maybe, or first—I think maybe I was still a first lieutenant, I don't know. So I led the thing and briefed it and led the mission. It was a napalm strike, and I still remember it very, very well. It was a successful mission. Some of the intelligence information later indicated that we had burned out that particular island, that they weren't going to go back there anymore. They were going to concentrate on some of the other islands. I was very proud of that. So it was a confidence that he had in me that I really appreciated.

We, normally, on bombing flights carried three 1,000-pound bombs. We were the first squadron, I think, or one of the first squadrons, to use that. Most of them carried either several 500s or two 1,000-pound bombs. We had done--

WILLIAMS: We've talked about this.

SEN. GLENN: Yes, I think we went into that, didn't we?

WILLIAMS: Yes, right.

SEN. GLENN: When Lindbergh was out there?

WILLIAMS: That's right.

SEN. GLENN: Carried two 2,000-pounders. Yes, we already covered that.

WILLIAMS: How did you deal with boredom, or was that never an issue?

SEN. GLENN: Oh, I don't think boredom was ever an issue. You're out there, you're in combat, and that focused your attention every day, when you're getting shot at. It was an area where when you're not out on a combat mission, it was quite pleasant, even though you were living in a tent sometimes or a Quonset hut other times.

WILLIAMS: What was your contact with the outside world?

SEN. GLENN: Practically zero. You might get—oh, things were sent from home. We got mail reasonably often. I don't think there was ever a time that we went without mail for more than maybe a couple of weeks when we were being transferred and the mail hadn't been forwarded to the right place or something. There would be newspapers from home and things like that, that would be sent out, and we'd pass those around. We've leave them in the ready room. After you got done reading your own paper, why, you just left it in the ready room where anybody that wanted it could look at it. That was pretty much the contact with the outside world.

We didn't have TV and satellite communication and things like that, of course. You had radios. I had bought a little short-wave radio and we had that, and there were these broadcasts that were sent out, the Armed Forces broadcasts.

We'd pick some of those up. They had a little radio station on Kwajalein that broadcast some records and news and things like that, and we'd pick that up all right. We'd get that every day. They had some news. So that was about our total contact with the outside world. As far as a daily paper or anything like that, there wasn't any.

WILLIAMS: How was your food and films and whatnot coming in? How was that accomplished?

SEN. GLENN: They'd come in on some of the transports that came through the islands out there. See, by the time we were getting ready to leave, there were a lot of transports coming through and going on out into the Western Pacific. They were building up, of course, out there, getting ready to go into Japan later on. But there would be the old planes that were later used, the bombers that were used for the attacks on Japan later on, would come through Kwajalein.

Of course, we were involved in keeping the islands there around that area beat down just so they could come through there. They would come through though. We had little contact with those people, though. They were mainly based on an Army Air Corps ramp over on the far side of the field. We were on the south side of the runway at Kwajalein with our own tent city and ran our own. That was the tent city where we lived out of there.

The runways were interesting out there. They were coral runways; they weren't paved. They'd get packed hard, but they used to have steamrollers, or rollers that were run by engines, of course. They weren't steam. But rollers would

have to roll the runway, and every day or every other day they would have big water trucks that went down and brought salt, seawater, and they'd run the full length of the runway and soak the runway down. The reason was, as long as you kept seawater and kept that runway damp, the coral was good and hard and solid. If you let it dry out and those little coral things died, then they just turned to dust. You'd have great amounts of coral dust that blew up and got in the engines and everything. So one of the ways they kept the runways in good shape then was with a water truck every day or every other day and a roller that went out and kept them rolled down. They were fine. They were hard-pack. They were as good a runways as you ever had, but you had to take care of them.

WILLIAMS: That was living material.

SEN. GLENN: That was living material, and you tried to keep it alive, yes. Now, on some other areas, we landed a few times on what was called Marston matting. The old Marston matting were sections of metal with holes in them that were about, oh, I suppose, two feet wide and maybe ten feet long. They came in different sizes. They were made with interlinking edges along the side, so one piece could be linked into another. Then the ends could be linked in. So sometimes where if you had some rough ground or ground where it was not as solid, you could put that Marston matting down and that became your runway. You landed on Marston matting, landing on those things. They would clank and bang and when you landed you could hear them even over the engine of your airplane, clank, clank, clank, as you rolled out on these things. But they were fine and they were used in

a lot of areas in the Pacific and other places, too.

Even to this day, in 1997, I'm going around to different places around the world, I still see Marston matting on some of these places where they haven't paved them yet. So it worked.

[Begin Tape 2, Side 1]

WILLIAMS: There were a few terms that I came across and I think some of them I know what they mean, but would you just describe them? Dead-stick.

SEN. GLENN: Dead-stick is a term, I don't know what its origination was, but dead-stick means that you're landing without any power. It'd be like you're flying a glider and you're coming down and you have no power to do anything else. Dead-stick means you're bringing it in without power.

WILLIAMS: Flying tail.

SEN. GLENN: Flying tail was something developed along when the F-86 was being developed. An ordinary tail on an airplane has the horizontal stabilizer which is solid, hooked into the airplane. Then you have an elevator on the back end of that, aft part of that, which moves up and down. That gives you your changing airflow and that gives you control of the pitch of the airplane.

When you got up to where we were getting to supersonic flight, the airflow was disrupted enough by shockwaves that it would blank out the effectiveness of those elevators on the back of the horizontal stabilizer. To correct that, what North American developed along with, I think, the old NACA—NASA's

predecessor, the National Advisory Committee of Aeronautics—developed a tail where the whole tail moved as a slab. The horizontal stabilizer and the elevators and everything moved all together, and that was called a flying tail.

WILLIAMS: A flame-out.

SEN. GLENN: Flame-out just means you lost all power. That's in relation to jet flying where you've got a continual fire going on back there and that gives you your thrust. Sometimes if something happens and that flame goes out, you've got a flame-out and you have no power. You're coming back and making a dead-stick landing. Either that or you get out of it, one or the other.

WILLIAMS: The yellow sheet.

SEN. GLENN: Yellow sheet, that's a gripe sheet. At the end of every flight, every pilot was supposed to fill in any discrepancies on the airplane or to state that it was okay. This was a guide to the maintenance crew and it was also a guide to the next pilot. In other words, if you'd had a compass problem and the maintenance people fixed the compass, for instance, the next pilot that flew that airplane would look at the yellow sheet before he took off. Your gripe, your complaint, from the previous flight was there, and the maintenance people had to sign off on it. But he would know that had occurred, so he could watch out for any anomalies on the flight that he was going to make on that same airplane.

So a yellow sheet was a way of passing information along and making sure that there was a record kept of complaints made on that airplane and sign-off by the maintenance crew on the airplane.

WILLIAMS: You used that in World War II, as well?

SEN. GLENN: Yes, World War II. I think yellow sheets are still—I'm not sure whether everybody calls them yellow sheets to this day, but you still have exactly the same kind of procedure. What's interesting is some of the veterans' organizations, aviation organizations, their newsletter they send around now is called *The Yellow Sheet*, because people knew what that was, a way of passing along information.

WILLIAMS: I want to go back to talking about the oxygen hop, because you had achieved a pretty high air speed during that. That wasn't supersonic.

SEN. GLENN: No, but it was right close to it. I think I didn't finish up that before. I think we got up to thirty-some-thousand feet and were in a dive—not a dive. You didn't just roll over and come down from up there, because the Corsair was not a supersonic airplane. But you could get it fast enough that you could begin to lose some of your flight control because certain parts, the tail section in particular, was having airflow go around it that at that local spot was supersonic, even though the whole airplane was not supersonic. In other words, you'd be getting pretty close.

It would make a sonic wave then that made your elevators back here partially ineffective. So if you got into that kind of a thing, it was something where you couldn't pull out of it. So you might be in a dive where you just went faster and faster and you couldn't pull out of it. So you avoided that, obviously.

On the flight that I think you're referring to, we got up and we were coming down—we figured later that we had been very, very close to that condition. The reason you have to be very close is because as you go up in

altitude, your air gets thinner and thinner. There are fewer molecules of air spread out, so you're approaching more of a vacuum once you get up there. You're not to that point yet.

So you have to be careful when you're at altitude in a prop plane like that, that you don't exceed a speed that is going to let local areas on the airplane go sonic, or supersonic, and lose control. We were right about at that limit on the flight that I made some notes on when we got back.

WILLIAMS: You were stunting at the time?

SEN. GLENN: Well, no, we were maneuvering to see how the airplane maneuvered. See, none of us had spent a lot of time up there at altitude. So we'd go up on these oxygen hops, we called them. We'd go up there once in a while just for training and maneuver and see what the limitations were on the airplane. You'd try different speeds and you'd try different maneuvers and try rolling and how much of a high-G turn could you pull at altitude. Well, the answer is, not much, because you start losing control and you start losing lift on this thing and it'll come down a little bit. So those were more familiarization ops. In the squadron I was in, we never had to actually do combat up that high, but we did do those flights as training, so if we ever did have to do that, we'd be prepared for it.

Corsair was a good airplane. It would perform about as well up at high altitude as any fighter plane in World War II.

WILLIAMS: You have talked some about Pete Haines. You first came into contact with him in San Diego?

SEN. GLENN: Yes, that's right.

WILLIAMS: Then did you lose touch with him after the war?

SEN. GLENN: No, Pete Haines, after the war, came back. We all came back to the States within a month or so of each other, out of that squadron. After the war was over, as a matter of fact, he happened to be assigned to be the commanding officer of what was then the naval reserve base at Columbus, Ohio. So I saw him a few times back there.

At that time he had some bumps on his shoulder when he came back. His wife insisted he go see a doctor finally, and to make a long story short, he was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. I was in a training command and he stayed there. He was surveyed out of the Marine Corps. They called it surveyed out, or was let out of the Marine Corps because of physical disability because of that. He elected to stay there in Columbus because at that time Ohio State University had one of the best programs in Hodgkin's research of any place in the country. Just happened that way. So he stayed there and went through a lot of treatment out there.

When they diagnosed the Hodgkin's, they said he probably had three to five years to live. Actually, he made it about, I think, it was seventeen or eighteen, something like that. So he did very well. He became a vice president during this time, vice president of Seagrave [phonetic] Fire Engine Company in Columbus, which makes a large portion of the fire engines for the whole country.

We kept in touch with him. But I was particularly interested in his

Hodgkin's problem, because I was down in Corpus Christi in the training command at the same time. When he was diagnosed with Hodgkin's and I heard about it, I had just developed some little bumps under my own skin, and I thought this was bad news personified. But I had some of them taken out; they were not. They were lipoma, which are little fatty tissues and a lot of people have a hundred or so of them all over their bodies. But I was very concerned about it for a while.

Back then, after I went back to Columbus and was going into political life, I saw him more often then.

WILLIAMS: But he was real mentor and an important person in your life?

SEN. GLENN: Yes, he was. He was. He's one that he was very dedicated to the Marine Corps and to running as fine a squadron as he could run. He took the whole thing very seriously. When new pilots came into the squadron, he made sure they were very, very careful. He trained. I've always been glad he was my first CO in the Marine Corps, because he was really almost an ideal squadron commander.

WILLIAMS: How would you generalize about the rest of the people in the squadron?

SEN. GLENN: Well, generalizing about people in the squadron was like generalizing about people in the United States. Our people didn't come from one part of the country. I've thought about that. We had a fellow named [Fred] Ochoa and his nickname was Bubba. Bubba Ochoa came from down south Texas. We had Olie Hanson [phonetic], who came from Minnesota, St. Cloud, Minnesota. We had another fellow that was out of the Bronx in New York. Tom Miller, my close friend, was from George, West Texas. I was from Ohio. Pete Ross, who was killed in an

accident later on, was from Glenview, Illinois. We had people from all over the whole country. Pete Haines had originally grown up in eastern Pennsylvania. His wife was from Ohio.

We had a whole squadron of people like that, that literally covered the length and breadth to this country. I guess that always happens in wartime when people are coming in like that. You're thrown together into one situation that you're all committed to, but you come from backgrounds as varied as the backgrounds of this country. We had people in the squadron that came from a background of more money. We had some that had nothing. They got their paycheck every month and that was it, and probably tried to send some of it home to their parents because they needed it. So it was that kind of a different background. At that time you had to have two years of college, so everyone at least had two years of college or they couldn't have been a pilot at that time.

WILLIAMS: And you all blended pretty well together?

SEN. GLENN: Blended wonderfully well together, yes. I think that was true of most units in a wartime situation like that. They didn't come from any one background, though, that's for sure.

WILLIAMS: Talking about the men in the squadron, when during World War II did you see women?

SEN. GLENN: Oh, only very rarely. When we were down in the Marshalls, I think there was a period of four months or five months that we hadn't seen a female form, native, American, or anything else. Except, well, once—no. Bob Hope came through

with one of these USO troupes and he had some of the Hollywood starlets and people along with him and they put on a show. At that time we hadn't seen a female of any kind for—it was quite a lengthy period of time. That created a little consternation when Bob Hope came through, of course.

WILLIAMS: I wondered about that, because, of course, so often you see that kind of a scene in the films and whatnot. What did it feel like to be sitting there and seeing all this glamour that comes in for a couple of hours and then they're off?

SEN. GLENN: Well, everybody gets all excited about it, of course, and it sort of broke the routine. That was the importance of it, I guess. I've always wondered whether it was all that important that they come in or not. But it was an interesting diversion, at least, during that period. They toured all over the place out there.

WILLIAMS: You were writing Annie on a daily basis, is that what you said?

SEN. GLENN: Well, almost daily. I don't think I wrote quite every day, but there were times when I wrote every day. There were a lot of times when we were busy or something that I would maybe make three days a week or something like that.

WILLIAMS: Those letters would go out in a package every so often?

SEN. GLENN: They'd go through a censor first. See, we had a squadron censor, and that squadron censor had to be somebody you trusted pretty well, because every letter that went out, no matter what you were saying, he had to see it. You weren't supposed to let anybody know where you were, what your unit was. Technically, I wasn't supposed to say anything that indicated whether I was down in the Marshall Islands or whether I was in Hawaii or where I was. I was always very

careful about that, anyway, so I don't think I got much clipped out of my stuff.

Then we had mail coming in. Mail would come in once, twice a week.

Sometimes three times a week. Something like that. It all depends.

WILLIAMS: After the censor got through with your letter, you wouldn't see it?

SEN. GLENN: No.

WILLIAMS: It would go on censored?

SEN. GLENN: No, but if he cut something out of your letter—Dick Mormon [phonetic] was the fellow that was our censor most of the time out there—if Dick cut something out, as I recall, he'd usually come around and say, "Hey, sorry I had to clip that, but you said so and so and so and so, and I didn't think you ought to do that." So the next time you wouldn't do it.

WILLIAMS: Was that his job?

SEN. GLENN: Yes. Well, he was the squadron intelligence officer. So he's the one that did the briefings on intelligence, got whatever pictures there were of the islands we were going to hit, he got those together. He got the maps. We had charts and maps. So he would do all the intelligence briefing and handle all that classified information such as we had, which wasn't much back in those—well, everything was basically classified then. But he was the squadron censor then also. So everything that went out had to go out through him.

WILLIAMS: Did you and Annie develop any little code system?

SEN. GLENN: No. She knew pretty much. I couldn't say the islands where we were, but you talk about palm trees and beaches and lagoons and things like that, why, it didn't

take—as I recall, we could talk about things like that. It's just on missions and the islands you hit and damage assessment, types of ordnance you were using, how many planes went out. All that operational stuff that was not—Dick Mormon had to keep all that stuff out of the mail.

WILLIAMS: Tell me now just a little bit about the ready room. What was that like?

SEN. GLENN: The ready room was where you got together for your briefings. It's where you kept squadron information on the airplanes. We used to have a file hung on the wall all the time, it was called "Read and Initial." "Read and Initial" was all the data on the airplane, new advisories out on certain things, on the use of fuel and the airplane and techniques. We usually had one of those strictly on the airplane itself, and then we had another one on tactics.

You were supposed to keep up to date on that. You had a sign sheet on there and you were supposed to read and initial and you put the date on which you read it. If somebody was not reading these things and signing off, why, you got on their back about why they weren't, as an operations officer. I think they still have that in most squadrons today. So those were always hanging there. People were expected to come in and read those.

Then the ready room was always where you had your briefings before every flight. You had crates or chairs. You didn't have regular formal chairs like you do aboard carriers or something like that, but you had crates or benches everybody sat on and you had a blackboard. We didn't have slide projectors or anything like that. But you had the briefing pictures and briefing maps. We didn't

have Xerox back then, so you didn't have a copy for everybody, usually. You would have some copies, if you wanted to. Maybe the leads of each division within the flight, within the squadron, might have particular pictures.

Then maybe after you had a general briefing, he'd get off with his four people or eight people, three flights per squadron, and they might have a separate briefing. Because we might be going out together and hitting different spots on the same island. So you'd have a little different briefing you'd break down. But all that was done in the ready room. It was sort of a gathering place for all the squadron pilots, and it was pilots. It wasn't a gathering place for all the mechanics and ordnance people and all that. It was a pilot's ready room.

You left from there to walk right out to the flight line. Or you walked out to the Jeeps with the trailers on and people would jump in the trailers. Then the Jeep would drive out and go down the flight line. Every pilot had his parachute on at that point. You'd carry your own chute and get out and they'd take you by, and as you came to your airplane you'd get out. Then usually when you came back in, it was a reverse of that. The Jeeps would be there with the little trailers to pick you up and take you back to the ready room. Otherwise, you'd be walking, trundling that parachute, banging along on your tail end, clear down the flight line.

WILLIAMS: You mentioned the mess hall and the ready room and the place where you had movies at night and whatnot. What other communal facilities were there?

SEN. GLENN: Well, showers, there was just sort of a canvas around. Sometimes you wouldn't even have canvas around. It was just out. You'd have a bag up here in which you

put water for a shower. You always had drinking water. It was called a "lyster bag." I think it's L-Y-S-T-E-R. Lyster bag. You didn't know what the condition of water was, and so you always had water that was purified. It was purified by putting in, I don't know what they put in, these halazone tablets or something like that. Made it taste a little bit. Those bags were all around, so you always had fresh water or drinkable water wherever you went. Those would just hang out under a palm tree or they'd be outside the door at the ready room. They had little spigots on them so that you could—they were big bags, maybe two feet across and maybe three feet high, something like that. So a little bit of pressure built up. They had these hoisted up so that you could—you didn't have a lot of individual little cups, you just pushed the button and got the water right in your mouth. Those were all over the place, so those were communal things.

Let's see, what else? About it.

WILLIAMS: Did the mechanics work on planes just out in the open air, or did they have a workshop?

SEN. GLENN: Depended on what they were doing. If you were doing something where if a rainstorm came up you could just throw a piece of canvas over it and that took care of it until the rainstorm passed, they'd work out in the open. Other times they would work—you'd have maybe a section of one of these kind of Quonset things some places that you could pull airplanes into. There weren't many of those out there, though. Usually most work was done out in the open. You've got to remember we didn't have all the sophisticated electronics stuff that they have

today. So most work could be done out in the open.

WILLIAMS: Somewhere in the records I saw that you have done 120 missions during World War II.

SEN. GLENN: No, there were 59 and 90, I think it was. I think it was 59 in World War II and 90 in Korea, I think it was. Because I think my total was 149.

WILLIAMS: You received three Distinguished Flying Crosses? Or am I mixing Korea up with World War II?

SEN. GLENN: Combined three or five. I think I have five total DFCs and eighteen Air Medals. I've got a lot of Air Medals.

WILLIAMS: Okay, we'll stop here.

SEN. GLENN: Okay. All right.

[End of interview]