2019-07-09 Preliminary Inventory of the Konstantin Fotić Papers, 1943-1958 SPEC.HRL.FOTIC Finding aid prepared by Hilandar Research Library Ohio State University Libraries Special Collections
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 This finding aid was produced using the Archivists' Toolkit 2019-09-25T12:38-0400 English Describing Archives: A Content Standard Konstantin Fotić Papers SPEC.HRL.FOTIC Ohio State University Libraries Special Collections 2.25 Cubic feet 1943-1958 (5) 5" letter document boxes; (1) 2.5" legal document box Serbian Fotić, Konstantin, 1891-1959 Arrangement of Materials

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 Preferred Citation

[identification of item], Konstantin Fotić Papers, SPEC.HRL.FOTIC, Hilandar Research Library, Ohio State University

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Materials in this collection are available for use, but may be used in the Thompson Library Special Collections reading room only.

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 Scope and Contents

This collection contains correspondence, financial records, and other materials documenting the Royal Yugoslav government in exile during World War II. It contains decoded top secret telegrams to Konstantin Fotitch (Constantine Fotić), Royal Yugoslav Government in Exile ambassador to the United States during WWII. Materials are dated 1943-1958.

 Biographical Note

Konstantic Fotić was the last royal Yugoslav ambassador to the United States.

 Acquisitions Information

Donated by Pola Fotitch Triandis, 2003

 Related Materials Inventory of the Konstantin Fotić Papers Fotić, Konstantin, 1891-1959 Mihailović, Draža, 1893-1946 World War, 1939-1945--Yugoslavia Yugoslavia--History--Axis occupation, 1941-1945 Royal Yugoslav Government in Exile 1943-1958 English officers as military advisers to General Draža Mihailović, decoded telegram 1 1 1944 January 3-4 In response to communication of 1943 November 24 (unnumbered), this decoded telegram discusses the presence of English officers sent to Draža Mihailović in Montenegro. Signed Puric, Str.Pov.br.2 ['Top secret no.2']. Regarding a 12 million dollar loan to the Royal Yugoslav Government 1 2 1944 January 6-14 Rising money and credit from Brazil and America, decoded telegram from Cairo 1944 January 6. Signed Puric. Discussions with Chase bank New York about finances decoded telegram from Fotic to Ministry of Foreign affairs from Cairo 1994 January 14. Two copied of a memorandum in English regarding a 12 million dollar loan by the Yugoslav Government. Pledged against gold deposited in the name of the Royal Yugoslav Government in New York. Dated 1944 January 14 Strictly Confidential Telegrams 1 3 1944 January 6 Personally to the Ambassador, Please, these telegrams are strictly confidential. And so, these telegrams should now be addressed to address: Puric, Yugoslav president government. Dated January 6, 1944 Secret telegram regarding Benes 1 4 1944 January 5-6 Personally for the President, About my top secret telegram with Benes. When Benes left our surroundings, I had learned that he had been in division on influence in Europe which had would have been in the area of Raska. Please talk to Roosevelt about this, and respond with an urgent telegram. Top secret, Puric. Date from Cairo January 5, 1944 – arrived January 6, 1944. Multiple telegrams regarding Yugoslav Government, 1943 December 28, 1944 January 8 1 5 1943-1944 Personally to the Ambassador, You all know the man better, and if you believe that this man has potential to work, please repeat his offer but if you do, make sure it is uncompromisingly against the partisan movement. See if this agaent has potential to work with the Yugoslav National cooperation. If all of this agrees, then please maintain this immediate arrival in Cairo. Top secret, Puric January 6, 1944 Personally to the President, I know very little of Cankara but from what Radoje Nikolic says, he’s a Yugoslav monarchist, but for Yugoslavia the Serbs has a specific role and considered that Mihalovic should have been removed since in today’s international situation, partisans are useful for us in so many ways. They should not be considered a part of the communist leadership. Fotic January 8, 1944 Personally for the ambassador, In response to your telegram about Ribarzu. Please let me know your opinion of Cankaru by telegram. Unnumbered, Puric. January 6, 1944 I received a telegram from government official Puric, who asked me to ask you in his name, if necessary if you would get with his government. Puric wishes to strengthen and highlight the strong Yugoslav character of his government and your longtime national work and commitment to the Yugoslav idea. Please be polite and respond to this letter right away via telegram. January 5, 1944 Personally for the Ambassador, Paraphrased: 1). Right away, please phone Ivan Subotic before he goes to Cairo, I need it to be urgent: for the Mediterranean committee especially, to talk to a high government official. At the same time, to be ambassador of Algeria or just someone to be there to possibly be able to join the government. Some are not afraid and would not show any discomfort if I was not sure of the duration. 2). I need a Slovenian clerk for our government. I am going to try and convince Rybarza to take obtain it, I don’t have another, I would offer him a portfolio of transportation because he knows maritime traffic and other portfolios. 3). Send an express letter from Cvjetisi from me, given to the case in which he accepts he will enter our government in which he will help reinforce. Please answer my telegram as soon as possible. Puric Russia and the Restoration of Yugoslavia 1 6 1944 January 4-7 Russia wants restoration of Yugoslavia. Contrary to the independent Croatia and Greater Serbia, we do not want to interfere with our international affairs regarding the monarchy – we will leave our nation to decide. Soviet Russia would kindly receive annexation of Trieste, Yugoslavia, but keep in mind that there was an agreement between the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians.Fotic 1-7-1944 Bebes impressions from Moscow: Except the boundary of the year 1940 where the boundaries are the Carpathians of Czechoslovakia, Russia has no territorial claims in Europe.; we are waiting to get into central Europe and the events in the Balkans in which we will take the constitution and decide together with England and America.I can’t imagine if Turkey entered the war by themselves especially, since Germany is trying to pull out of connection with the Balkans. Between the British officials, the opinion in that case is that British should have used non-intervention during the Spanish civil war. New page A high official returning from Moscow reported that they have no desire to take over Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia territory will not be split up and there will not be a greater Croatia or Serbia Territory. This is not Moscow’s intention- the Yugoslav army will have to make their own decisions about the monarchy. Moscow was sympathetic to the Partisan movement. Russia would be ready to come to an agreement with Yugoslavia, but under no conditions will they interact with the Cairo Government. Take note that the USSR Ambassador recently was accredited to the government. The USSR will work upon incorporating the area of Trieste into Yugoslavia, but it will depend on the internal agreement with the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. I get a similar understanding from the English side. An invasion now is not an option, nor will it be in the future. If Turkey enters the war which I still can’t believe, it is going to be strange because Germany is going to be forced to withdraw itself from the Balkans. With the English, there option is that they should have used the policy of Non-intervention as well especially during the Spanish war. Please talk to the officials about this option. Regrading the removal of Mihailovic 1 7 1944 January 8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cairo: Top Secret – Personally for President Vlade I was in an interview with the English about the removal of Mihalovic. He was surprised about how the English ambassador said that he could join with the U.S. Government. I told them I have no intention at all to so such a thing. He reiterated to me that their position remains as indicated in the Secretary of State Hall on December 10 of last year. Fotic Agreement with Mihailovic and Tito 1 8 1944 January 10-11 Personally for the ambassador: Regarding your unnumbered telegrams; whatever agreement was taken place between Mihalovic and Tito was impossible without the cooperation of our government as the great powers especially, with Russia to whom we strive to continue with. Only within a general agreement on the ground between the Guerillas group and the division zone of action. Mihailovic and Croatia 1 9 1944 January 4-6 Personally for the ambassador : In pervious correspondence to our telegram TS #60 General Mihalovic has given similar instructions repeatedly, it’s a very difficult position but there is no support among the people. Many of his people are for the independence of Croatia. He was trying to catch a military man upon entry into Croatia. We want to help them establish their own peace. With the allies, Macek ranks poorly and with his party but for now, this does not count. Top Secret Puric Air Force support and General Mihailovic 1 10 1944 January 2-14 As you know, from our side is emphasized in the agreement that our airmen in America that the crews primarily used for sending aid to General Mihalovic. In that sense, the US headquarters supreme commander of the air force gave instructions to the commander number 12. Aviation force letter from October 8 which has brought major Misovic. In your letter, General Doolittle from 4 months ago brought the first supply of troops under the leadership of general Mihalovic for transferring personnel in Yugoslavia because of the war task group that has been reassigned. To supply General Mihalovic we need at least 15 groups that have radio contact with him. This connection needs to happen soon because of the Allied Air Commands. Meanwhile, our aviator bomber unit conducted assignments in the group to which belong in these circumstances. We have already lost half of the devices in two cities; Sofija and Augsburg. Please try to preserve our aviators for the main purpose. Allow radio connection with General Mihalovic. Memorandum: The Yugoslav aviators were sent to the US for ‘Liberator’ training. The purpose was to be able to send supplies to General Mihalovic. Yugoslav Prime Minster Bozidar Puric, requested that the Yugoslav men should be used only to supply and transport troops to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav aviators have taken part with the American air force to which they were attached in bombing operations in Germany and Bulgaria. Half the planes and crew have been lost. The Yugoslav army has the honor to request that the remaining planes are used to send materials and supplies to the fighting forces of General Mihalovic. Mihailovic's discussions with the English 1 11 1944 January 13 Under the last 23 months, Mihalovic reports suggest that the English mission to mediate and attend a meeting of his partisans and delegates to break the war and for joint action against occupiers. General please I pray, that you keep this a secret. It is understood that it is an expression of weakness or disagreement with the royal government. The English ambassador provided me the general’s telegram. There was a note already reported to the foreign ministry. There is a way to act as an intermediary and that if he saw there is nothing that prevented General Mihalovic. To directly address the Partisan headquarters. Please report the front to Canada. Puric Turkey declares war on Germany 1 13 1944 January 15-16 Personally for the Ambassador: January 15-16 In regards to telegram top secret 133 – Coming to you for personal notification according to the information Ilija Sumenkovic gave to the foreign minister in Tehran was resolved to make a big move on to Turkey to immediately declare war on Germany and the Allies cede airbase to remain defensive. This was done by pressure on the Cairo Conference and continued in Ankara. Turks avoiding definitely a positive response but are holding talks on military and political leadership issues related to the possible entry to the war. Turks will seek military assistance in the war by repeating that they see not require English forces. Immediately after the declaration of war, Germany invaded Turkey, also believing that Bulgaria took part in the attack. The English however replied that Germany does not have enough power for a successful attack on the Turkish. I guarantee the protection of the Turkish air strikes and Bulgarians participation in an attack in unlikely after the Soviet Russia declare war. The English claim to the entry of Turkey into action to produce a breakdown of the satellites in the Balkans. The first result would be the conquest of the island in English seaside and opening times for the supply of Russia through the straits. Bearing in mind in particular Russia, Turkey seeks real guarantees of the safety of their land and the Balkans. The best idea is to have Turkey enter the war and become an active copula. With direct negotiations with Soviet Russia they did not want the Turks. Seen even more evidence that the Balkans at least, at least until the end of the war, left to a zone of Russian influence. Turkish foreign minister thought that the soviets want the Balkans full of political influence that would achieve by creating a situation similar to the one you are trying to create Yugoslavia. Sumenkovic says that the Turkish government still taught in concrete and direct talks with the soviets. Puric The King became head of the Yugoslav Partisans 1 14 1944 January 15-16 Personally for the Ambassador, The united press in January from London, the Partisan delegates communicated an agreement with the King and Tito. The king became head of the board of the Yugoslav Partisans. The terms of agreement, the Yugoslav government was in exile, the representatives abroad are canceled and General Mihalovic is fired. A conference was being held between the British Service and British Ambassador, which recommended an allied proposal government. Although that was a fantastic idea, it gave us more pressure but it made sense to give up. This made us think about the most serious problem: 1. Find out if there is such a crazy suggestion and if so, by all means get rid of them. 2. If you would still like to take this into consideration and determination to try to make chaos in public and potential circles. Although the prince will never accept it. Mihalovic would undoubtedly accept it in this case that the government has formed, and the Balkan front will be in the future. Allies abolished any help with the Guerillas in Yugoslavia and Greece with the exception of naval bases probably near Crete. Rhodes and the islands in relation to the possible entry in Turkey into the War. All assistances and actions rely on Tito, who is the only one effective with one enemy. 3. Tito’s conditions laws for cooperation and impossible to admit what we do not recognize. Please respond to this telegram – the front submitted for knowledge and management. Puric Turkey's position in the war 1 15 1944 January 20-21 The ambassador asked me to order you instructions to help his ambassador in Ankara. Turkey must enter the war as soon as possible, which is the interest of our general. His ambassador has a tough position. Turkey does not believe that the English bona fide are already pushing war on Russia’s request. They are looking for my beliefs. My response went as followed: Turkey wants to guarantee them and the Dardanelles. This will get the most participation in the war. The theory is that they don’t lose the train. Turkey is getting scared that Russians are going to Bulgaria, eventually to Yugoslavia. They then need to be convinced that Russia has no aspirations to enter the Balkans. Not only that, Turkey knows better than us. But also they need to be convinced that the English policy against the entry of Russia into the Balkans. The ambassador stays quite. Turkey fears that if you go to war, don’t show up to Tito. The Ambassador is unresponsive. Turkey is afraid of the Bolshevik revolution and the Civil War in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The ambassador says that we apply a policy of non-intervention. If this is the talk in Ankara, failure is understandable. I suggested that the only way to it is if the Turkish, English and US come together in a close cooperation together and organizing groups in Bulgaria that in order to conduct a coup and joined the Allies. This would reinforce and support the entry of the Turkish troops in flow through Bulgaria which, will eventually useful to serve and continue. Bulgaria needs to promise more or less of the pre-war territory and an unequal place among the Balkans. The only possible guarantee for Turkey’s application is the principles of the Balkans to the Balkan peoples. In any case, Turkey will lose the War because there is a dispute between Russia that has not been resolved. Please talk with the English ambassador and Turkish government. It is important to help the Turks into the War. Please with your hand of constant action, it will help to bring peace into the entire village of Europe. Puric Puric has sent the following information to the ambassador of Turkey: The British Ambassador Anthony Eden has requested that the Yugoslav prime minister give instructions to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Ankara- they would like to have Turkey enter the war and Yugoslavia agrees. Although, Turkey believes that the only reason that Britain is bone fide and only wants them to join the war because they want action with Russia. Their conversation went as followed: Puric said that all Turkey wants is a guarantee for herself and the Dardanelles. And they will obtain this through the participation of war. The prime minister remarked that Turkey fears Russia will enter Bulgaria and then eventually, Yugoslavia. The British Ambassador remarks that Russia has no ambitions in the Balkans. Turkey fears that if once they enter war, that someone like Tito will also appear. The Yugoslav prime minster also added that the Turks are afraid of the Bolshevist revolution and a civil war in Bulgaria that may eventually come into Yugoslavia. The British will apply a policy of non-intervention. These arguments make Ankara having little chance of succeeding. The Yugoslav prime minister said the only thing for Turkey, Great Britain and Yugoslavia to do is to collaborate; a group. They should join the allies and help support the Turkish groups in Bulgaria. Bulgaria should be promised her pre-war territory and equal place among the Balkan nation. The only possible guarantee for turkey is to apply the principle of the “the Balkans for the Balkan people”. They should have an important role after the war otherwise; Turkey will leave and directly settle with Russia. Macek and his party are against the Partisans 1 16 1944 January 22-23 Personally for the Ambassador: Please provide me an interest to find me an English ambassador that informed their government who definitely refused to transfer from Bari to Cairo. Tomo Jancikovica claimed to carry a message from Macek, under the pretext that he was in contact with the enemy before his arrival. According to our information and messages the Macek and his party were against the Partisans which may also explain the above decisions. Puric Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador 1 17 1944 January 26 Encrypted telegram – Ministry of Foreign affairs Top Secret Personally for the Ambassador in response to telegram 363/43. I was informed during several interviews in the local ministry of foreign affairs of your conversations with the soviet Ambassador; I always gained the conviction that such our position is considered here as understandable. A senior person from the vicinity of the president tells me that she believes that the attitude with the approval of the president came and removed some fear of our policy of their anti-Russian tendency- because that person is advised not to discourage and preserve in further efforts in this direction. Benes claims there is no agreement 1 18 1944 January 25-26 In regards to my telegram 5, London said the following: Benes explicitly claims that there is no agreement the three great powers disputes and political impacts. As for the rest of us, we all agree to restore Yugoslavia and turn off separation. Puric Cairo and their government 1 19 1944 January 26 In regards to my telegram 5, London said the following: Benes explicitly claims that there is no agreement the three great powers disputes and political impacts. As for the rest of us, we all agree to restore Yugoslavia and turn off separation. Puric Regarding short-term loans 1 20 1944 February 7 February 7, 1944 (Two English letters – written to two different people but both have the same content) Mr. Harry Ward President, Irving Trust Co. To Mr. Ward: I wish to thank you for securing a short-term loan pledged against our gold deposit. In the meantime, ten million dollars have been transferred from Brazil to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. Thus, the short-term loan has become unnecessary. Thank you for this – Constantin Fotic Second letter: Winthrop Aldrich Chairmen, Chase National Bank SAME CONTENT AS ABOVE, DIFFERENT PERSON The government is no longer sending Mihailovic telegrams 1 21 1944 January 26 Top Secret – Personally for the Ambassador Today the state department would like to report that in the future, we will no longer be able to send telegrams to General Mihalovic. This decision was brought in after finding long depression of Englishmen to the state department and ministry of military. The British rush to reasons that they have responsibility to conduct military operations in that part of Europe. They can afford to be in Yugoslavia to send telegrams. These telegrams hold content which is unknown to them, which may also include military alerts. The director of the department announced his decision and said that he regretted it. They are also trying to enable us to have a relationship with the general. The director also believes that it would be best to have telegrams sent to the general so the text can be encrypted and decrypted at the embassy. If you agree with their restrictions, urgently send me the passwords dealing with Mihalovic. This decision does not apply to open telegrams although, Englishmen insist that they cease. Fotic Telegram could not be delivered to Mihailovic 1 22 1944 January 28 Ministry of Foreign Affairs In regards to telegram 21, your telegram could not be delivered to General Mihalovic. Fotic “Quisling and Chetniks” 1 23 1944 January 28 Please note that in the last and pervious communique “Free Yugo” speaks to the partisans of entering into a new hind killed “Quisling and Chetniks”, which clearly shows that in those places liquidate the population. The local public began to consider it natural. I think it would be good to take a step in the general character of allied governments and ask them to act to prevent “punishment” rather than establish regular courts will scout the liberation of guilt and impose penalties. As defined in the declaration of the United Nations, otherwise it is left to the people. Fotic Negotiations between English and Turkey 1 25 1944 January 29-30 January 29, 1944 Cairo – January 30, 1944 D.C. In regards to my telegram Top Secret 23. Ankara said: The negotiations between the English and Turkey have entered a critical phase and conflicts in terms of quantities of war material. The English believe that Turkey is avoiding going to war. There are indications that the Turks could reorient their policy and conform to the Russians in order to ensure against the possible reprisals from the English. Puric January 29, 1944 Cairo In regards to your telegram 28 from the previous month: Today I have received from Cvjetise from your pervious letter. I thank you for your confidence, but I doubt that my entry into the government could come in what situations contribute fixes that politics and tribal separatism, and chauvinism. Because I find that it would be better to stay where I was, keeping unusually friendly relationships with the Brazilian government. They are prolonging their pervious successful work among the Yugoslav Emigration of Brazil and all of Southern America. If you still consider my participation in the government necessary, it could be based on the policy of the Yugoslav national, state unity and the full solidarity of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which is the only one of us that can be saved, removing all that is in opposition to it. In that case it would have required me to be in the government and secure a position that would allow real impact on the conduct of state policy because otherwise my entry would not make sense. In my option, government policy would have been sent from one side of inner reconciliation and avoiding civil war. They have liberated the people of democratic governance and peoples freedoms. That corresponds to the consecrated traditions of Serbia and Karadjordjevica on the other hand, when the approach to Russia to preserve existing relations with Britain and the United States. In order to protect our national interests, national independence, and integrity. Neither personal nor partisan issues must not interfere with the Government that would have to retain the character and mission of the interim committee of national salvation. With friendly greetings, Fotic. (Unnumbered) The sons of Somodlake 1 26 1944 January 30-31 There have not been any suggestions or pressure mode. The son of Somodlake is a doctor and the other is a lawyer from split. They are in detachments of General Mihalovic in Croatia. Puric In regards to telegram 22 and 63 1 27 1944 February 1-5 Personally for the Ambassador, In regards to our telegram 22. Please provide me the beginning of the telegram that you could send to General Mihalovic. In regards to our telegram Top Secret 63. Please provide me two telegrams of 27 and 28 last month as a whole and are not to be submitted to General Mihalovic. English and Greek ambassador 1 28 1944 February 4 In regards to telegram 33. On the 28th of the previous month Ankara said: The English ambassador said that we could have the Greek Ambassador and I help prove to the Turks the inaccuracy of the two Turkish thesis: first, that Germany is strong enough to attack and occupy the Turkish straits and second that they do not bind a Guerrilla war against Yugoslavia and Greece and serious numbers of troops and prevent Germany to send the required troops against the Turks. They have eventually said that now we only discuss military-technical issues that cannot be in this state using efficient and need to wait until the end of the phase. About our conversation with Stevenson and your suggestions that I have outlined, the English ambassador from London did not notice the instructions. He told me that it cannot be by your suggestions plead not work before you get above article and the instructions. I bring you good working knowledge. Puric Meeting with Eden and other ambassadors 1 29 1944 February 4-10 February 10, 1944 Cairo Personally for the president: Today I met with Eden and saw your message that they had a brief report with their ambassadors. Dan tells me that England will now proceed but it’s not excluded in the near future. He connects to the return of Mclean who recently returned with protection and I think this affected protection may insist that the British government of its intention to exercise. It is interesting to me that Dan is repeating that their position remains unchanged, said the NJ.V.Kraji “act wisely”, but immediately added that this was his personal opinion. He also told me that he believed that this king’s attitude came as spontaneous expression of his belief in what proved to be a match for the situation. Fotic Personally for the Ambassador I bring you good working knowledge and management. The official talks here today over the English Ambassador Eden sent the following telegram: NRZ letter from Cairo to the Daily. Neralda and observer ITM I see that the debate the issue of withdrawal of England Military Mass is in general Mihalovic of the rift between him and further allies that suggests a public renunciation. Mihalovic is under the pretext of his inactivity and even collaboration with the enemy. I consider my duty to joint allied things to you personally ask you not to make a similar decision because I am convinced that their consequences were very serious the general policy of shortening the war in the Balkans and central Europe. Especially in the beginning of the year in which we all hope is prohibited. We did not even want to or so not want interruption of relations with Mihalovic. Signs and severance of all relations with all ethnic Yugoslavs and especially with the entire Serbian Nation, your most loyal ally to the world war and war, which is in the most difficult moment in part the greatest sacrifice demonstrated awareness of their allies and international responsibilities and duties. It would be inevitably interpreted infidelity with allied partied to work constructively in the Balkans, which is a bloody fight with invincible difficulties. Now that you are tired of most satellite nations, of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and the Nazis prepared to begin relinquished combat system of intimidation as Tito required having Germany make them preserve to the end in this war, if not I want them to feel it. Only people like him and Mihalovic like, which will at any given moment I’m confident to appear in other countries many have their nations with honor drawn from this war and national pride. They are not indispensable, but they are a reality and will always be darkness and therefore do not need to close the door. The less that would be the only interruption in favor of the enemy, and in favor of dubious social movements for which you or our people and no other nation in this war, which I am sure you will not want to tie their name too. Finally please note the embarrassing position that would lead to the Yugoslav government and public official termination relations of the United Kingdom with its minister’s military in the occupied country. Authorized I announce to you that they are not NJ.V.Kraji nor his government to renounce the possibility of moral its people who suffer it in unprecedented bloodshed and persistently struggles in a way that is only possible, and they do not see them. At least on the behalf of the federal: the Ministry can be taken for the right to fight and the hope for victory. The whole problem, which is not interested in Yugoslavia is too versatile and complicated, too delves into the meaning and the essence of this war, as well as the future people who engage in him that it could be saved temporary and the variable short-lasting military policy. Please do not make unilateral decisions in this way- As before and now, which I and the Royal Government stand. You are still in the mood to cooperate allied find solutions that will satisfy all stakeholders night a copy of the telegram I handed over to the local American Ambassador. Puric Top Secret 76 In regards to telegram 3401 and 3636 1 30 1944 February 7-8 In regards to my telegram 3401 and 3636 from last year. Please respond to my urgent telegram, please let me know if this has been posted and when, and if not, when will it be published in at least three shows over the Boston radio messages “silent pipe run deep”. Top Secret 70, Puric In regards to telegram TS 21 1 31 1944 February 7-8 In regards to our telegram Top Secret 21. They insist for now to receive to open and the other if need be will send later and report. Top Secret 75 Puric New address of ambassador Puric 1 34 1944 February 19-20 Please submit in the future to address personal Puric Yugoslav Prime Minster only telegram extremely cryptic and whose contents of the need to be aware of the president and the government. Puric Impression of President Roosevelt 1 35 1944 February 21 Top Secret Personally for the ambassador: I have the impression that President Roosevelt leaving my reception has to do with the current situation. Please answer my telegram if you want him to take my written memorandum and our situation and what that particular point is. In an interview with Dunn, he told me it would be a good idea to file a memorandum. Fotic Top Secret 35 General Mihailovic and American officers 1 36 1944 February 21 Personally for President Vlade: The head of our state department says to me that one of the American officers located at General Mihalovic’s a short time ago said: “many bundled up were entered in relation to the situation here, many wrong decisions are made. Please wait until I have the opportunity to inform you about everything.” The officer’s name that he couldn’t tell me was invited to Washington and needs to arrive soon. Top Secret 36 Fotic The King has been assassinated 1 37 1944 February 21 There has been news that the king has been assassinated. This stipulates the “Yugoslav Fascists” who want to discredit the officers and soldiers in Cairo whom want to fight Tito. Fotic Simovic's statement 1 38 1944 February 22 Personally for president Puric Simovic’s statement made a great impression. The state department tells me that they had the last few days of an indication that the British are preparing something with it. In my conversations, especially if stressed that Simovic’s statement will not change, how the factual situation in the country will certainly come to bring more confusion in assessing our problem. It also gave details about his character and his abilities and the reasons that led to his removal as outlined in a letter to the king on January 11, 1942. Characteristics in the American radio station Europe had instructions not to publish his speech. Today’s newspapers regarding the “assassination” bring news from London that the king of the virtual prisoner of a clique around him that he is allowed to come in contact with allied leaders and to be expected to Simovic soon. From a government that will be able to unite all the people elements. This is likely derivation of the English plan to force king to legitimize Tito and eventually to perform without his participation on the pretext that the king is not free in his decisions. However, the situation is difficult and the pressure of strong means that such intentions can frustrate a firm stand. I do not believe that the Englishmen went so far as to brutally impose such a solution no matter under what pretext. Fotic Favorable opinions of the general 1 41 1944 February 24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cairo Personally for the President: The US Ambassador reported that if their officers who have recently reported from Cairo, gave a favorable opinion of the general and have underscored the requirement to take account of the sensations of the Serbian people. Fotic Termination of Anglo-Turkish negotiations 1 42 1944 February 25-26 The immediate reason for the termination of Anglo-Turkish negotiations is because of the confusion of war materials. Englishmen also refuse to indicate military aid. The Turks will fight if they successfully resist German attack. Puric Stevenson and the government 1 43 1944 February 25-26 The telegram that was sent to London: Stevenson suggested their government follow a definite attitude. The Yugoslav question is too complicated and should be it should be treated only for military and helping those who struggle against the enemy. Puric The officer in Cairo has arrived 1 44 1944 February 25-26 The officer arrived in Cairo. Please try to find out details from his reports and report to me. Puric Moscow and London jockeying for influence 1 45 1944 February 24-26 The king’s detention are like and are usually fabrications in order to discredit the royal government and in order to pressure her relentless posture in terms of General Mihailovic. Moscow now accepts where London relented and perhaps given up. Puric Supplying General Mihailovic 1 46 1944 February 25-26 If you get rid of the memorandum that underlines the risk of Russian imperialism through the Balkans and Europe and out incomprehensibility because everyone entered the war and thus should lose. The Balkans are an obstacle that general Mihailovic and the Yugoslav Army in our country that is forced not perished our country communists but shall arise until the last moment in the discharging is in the Balkans. To fight on two fronts our request to supply him with war materials and money, even if it means to use what Roosevelt gave us. In any case remain neustupno and fight until the end of the line of democratic freedoms and the Atlantic Charter. Spheres of Responsibility 1 47 1944 February 28-29 Fotic giving instructions on responsibilities of various persons Department of Middle East, Ankara Embassy 1 48 1944 March 5 From interviews with the director of the department of the Middle East have the impression that the actions of the U.S. ambassador in Ankara did not come here for no education. They also said that Ankara only took the English and even from last year, they weren’t required to negotiate with Turkey. Fotic Turkish government and the governments-in-exile of Yugoslavia and Greece, 1944 February 29-March 1 1 48 1944 The American Ambassador spoke to Sumenkovic and said it would be the decision of the Turkish government and a great impact if the representatives of Yugoslavia and Greece give to know the name of their government for Turkey to be entering into the war and that did a great service to their country, and in the case of Turkey, otherwise run the risk that the final departed from its Balkan allies. Puric Conversation with Ribarzom 1 49 1944 March 1 I spoke with Ribarzom and he would have received the position without hesitation please solves it as soon as possible. Fotic Soviet attitudes towards Yugoslav government 1 50 1944 March 1 Soviet ambassador to our government said Mac Veagh in that he believes that the American attitude toward us in perfect condition. Dunn believes that the Soviets were not as Englishmen for Tito but to await developments with us and will opt to political reality. Fotic Withdrawal of British mission to General Mihajlovic 1 53 1944 March 5 According to what assistant Donovan has to say, the English chose to withdrawal the mission of the general Mihajlovic and made without prior consultation with them. The Americans do not agree with this policy. Fotic Churchill speech re. Tito 1 54 1944 March 7 Especially regarding that Churchill speech must have caused some discomfort in Moscow its final unreserved resignation of Tito. Our friends here think that today would just be perfect to re-done gesture towards the Russian government. Strength of Yugoslav factions 1 55 1944 March 7 Kosanovic and Slobodan state that now entitled “now they want to cheat the allies” then they write “horns of a kind Yugoslav Congress.” Mihalovic will not confuse its allies and impose over their people. Yugoslavia will cheat no one. Tito has the biggest forces. Fotic U.S. Military Mission 1 56 1944 March 6-7 Of three members of the U.S. military mission there are two left Mihalovic, chief Lieutenant Seiz which is surrounded by partisans in Berane because he believed that it will leave the country without it over Mihajlovic's men, and Captain Mansfield whom the latter conducted to Cavtat leaves for Washington with very favorable for our report. Puric American and British relationships with Tito 1 57 1944 March 8 The State Department tells me that they “do not agree and one does not have English policy towards the U.S.” The English tell me many disagree with this policy and even Churchill himself had a lot of reason to be satisfied with Tito that he "got out of hand," in which he normally never held tightly. Fotic How to Safely Communicate with the Chairman 1 58 1944 March 8 Please let me know by telegram what the safest way to communicate with the Chairman. Fotic British support of partisans 1 59 1944 March 9 Not only does Churchill not increase the position of Tito and the Partisans on the ground, but before the allies showed that the sole support of partisans by the British government is based not on the actual situation on the ground, but as part of British imperial policy. Fotic Undersecretary Stettinius going to English conference 1 60 1944 March 12 Undersecretary Stetinius with several senior State Department clerk leaves the other half to a London to discuss some of the English political issues. Subject of the conference is limited and it is likely that will our situation be discussed. I’ll visit Stetinusa before his departure and submit his memorandum about our attitude. Accompanying him is also the Director of the Department of Middle East Mare that familiar with our questions. Fotic Todorovic as liaison officer with U.S. military 1 61 1944 March 12 Mansfield went 7 of the current month to the United States. With him, you should let us go Capitan Todorovic which Mihalovic appointed liaison officer with the U.S. military mission and that mission is out of the country, its current path seems to have been disabled by an Englishman. Todorovic also carries useful material out of the country as well as the letter of the Turkey for you here we'll do everything to go right now. Rasic Diplomatic crisis 1 62 1944 March 13 Please keep me constantly notified during the development of the crisis. If you order to go to the solution in addition to your drawing of Draza and cleaving the reaches one pro-partisan government intends to make a statement that such a government cannot impersonate people in Yugoslavia, especially Serbs. Of course I do not want to do anything that could now interfere in the negotiations but please notify me in a timely manner. (Molim te potvrdi prijem) – Handwritten Cyrillic message. – Translation (Please confirm receipt) Fotic Conversation with Deputy Minister re. British policy 1 63 1944 March 13 Today I spoke with the Deputy Minister of Dunn machine that tells me they are not at all like what the English press have continually emphasized that America agrees with the English policy towards no. "That's not true," said Dunn, "and we are not authorized by the British Government to speak on our behalf. Our position is clearly marked: assist all those elements who fight against the enemy and the political situation is not resolved by the people after the war. meanwhile recognize only the king and the government-in-exile. " Congressman Busby in congress 1 64 1944 March 13 Congressman Busby said today in Congress about Mihalovic and reactions that matter to the American people and government who hear Mihalovic before the London decisions that could fatally damage his extraordinary action that you initially used to defeat allies. Fotic Remove government stimulus 1 65 1944 March 14 The Foreign Office should be to propose to the king to remove from government stimulus, before Tito gave commitments regarding the monarchy. Tito on March 4 said that in this case took the "re-considered" new situation. Fotic Struggle for liberation 1 69 1944 March 22 We learned that like me, at all locations spoke extremely hot on the Serbian people, victims who knowingly submit to the struggle for liberation and the particular rejected the idea of any cooperation Mihalovic in September and October last year and a disappointment to those viewed as having by the English radio partisans or completely ignored. Fotic Article written by Radica 1 70 1944 March 23 Radica wrote an article in the NATION which accused the government and Ambassador for treason against Yugoslavia and allies and cited a range of talks and false facts. All has been reported as sensations of the first order, so I was forced to give especially witness via NY Times. Fotic Seiz American colonel who work with Mansfield 1 71 1944 March 22-23 Seiz American colonel who work with Mansfield, and was detained at Partizan, arrived in Cairo a few days ago and went straight to America. The U.S. Embassy 1 72 1944 March 23 The U.S. Embassy received the instructions for the new formalities. Fotic U.S. service heard that Seiz disagrees with Mansfield 1 73 1944 March 24 The U.S. service heard that Seiz disagrees with Mansfield who says he is partisan Chetnik. Rasic Stalin and the King 1 74 1944 March 24 Local friends are asking me if I suggest that if it is true that Stalin sent personal King use this sign of good mood and immediately ask through you consent to the appointment of a new ambassador. Fotic Captain Todorvića for new pagination 1 75 1944 March 29 Embassy received from Captain Todorvića everything is in good condition for new pagination. Attention is drawn to the pagination that the Ministry is also mentioned in the letter which was a 302-30 poinstena and cannot see. Fotic The Brazilian Bank 1 76 1944 March 28 The Brazilian bank pulled out money to make a transfer. Fotic Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 1 77 1944 March 28-29 Please Report to me when he went the local Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Puric. Jevtic State Department 1 78 1944 March 29 The State Department told me that the seismic submitted extraordinarily favorable reports in the same spirit in which Mansfield's and explanation of them has deepened. Fotic Pribicevic proved his awareness 1 79 1944 March 29 I learned from reliable and highly confidential sources that Pribicevic proved his awareness of our issues posted its directors to have a chance to read a confidential report that I have personally sent. Fotic Attitude of General Mihalovic 1 80 After reports of officers who came from the headquarters of General Mihalovic here obviously improved mood and to share general Mihalovic and attitude towards the royal government in relation to our questions. The appearance of the solution to America's mission is to be repeated and enlarged, and in general to be materially and morally to greater support. Fotic Partisan Civil attacking Macek 1 83 1944 April 1 The open telegram I sent you yesterday are broadcast stations that partisan Civil attacking Maceka as a surprise for the local Croatian newspaper that it hopes will take partisan Macek such authority if his supporters to crush the partisan movement and follow movement Mihalovic treated as large-Serbian group. Fotic A new pagination in the dictionary, 1944 March 31-April 1 1 84 1944 Please immediately enter a new pagination in the dictionary. Begin using the April 6th to further commands for communication with London, Ankara, Constantinople and Algeria and ministries in business. Rasic U.S intelligence officer 1 85 1944 April 2 In the Middle East an U.S intelligence officer arrived who had spent several weeks with Tito. Delivered the telegraph report that is unfavorable for protection and which refutes many compliments about the partisans. Fotic A memorandum of our entire situation 1 86 1944 April 3 Here is a memorandum of our entire situation. Fotic Memorandum in English- 12 pages Memorandum on the whole our situation 1 87 1944 April 4 Memorandum 1 88 Same content as folder 86 and 87 2 Letters re. Tito's government 2 1 1954 August 16 Letters to and from K. Fotic regarding the policies Tito's government Letter re. forced repatriation of Yugoslav POWs 2 41 1955 March 25 Letter from K. Fotic to Italian Ambassador Mario Luciolli re. forced Italian repatriation of Yugosalv POWs. Letter re. Dobrosav Jevdjevich 2 68 1955 Sept 8 Letter from Italian Foreign Office to K. Fotic re. Dobrosav Jevdjevich Letter re. visa for Dobrosav Jevdjevich 2 70 1955 March 9 Letter from Elbridge Durbrow to Konstantine Fotic about a visa issued for Dobrosav Jevdjevich, president of the Serbian Chetniks Veterans Organization. Questionnaire re. Private Organizations in the U.S. Dealing With Foreign Affairs 3 4.9 undated Questionnaire sent out questioning organizations dealing with foreign affairs Letter re. Serbian Chetniks Veterans Organization 3 4.11 1955 February 15 Letter from K. Fotic to Mr. Durbrow about the Serbian Chetniks Veterans Organization. Letter to Peter II of Yugoslavia re. struggles for freedom in the Balkans 3 5.19 1947 May 1 Letter from Dr. George M. Dimitrov to King Peter II of Yugoslavia regarding the anti-Communist struggle waged by Balkanic peoples. Letter re. visa refused to Peter II of Yugoslavia 3 5.29 1947 May 2 Letter from Arthur Bliss Lane to K. Fotic about King Peter II of Yugoslavia being denied a visa to enter the U.S. Letter re. visa denial to Peter II 3 5.3 1947 April 30 Letter from unknown person to Arthur Bliss Lane re. Peter II denied a visa Oversize folders 4 1944-1958 Letter re. Serbian Central National Committee and Marshal Tito 5 6.1 1953 June 5 Letter K. Fotic to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles about royalist resistance to Marshal Tito and Tito's government in general Letter re. Vidov-dan festival 5 6.3 1953 April 13 Letter from Serbian National Defence Council of America to Congressman Kersten of Wisconsin inviting the Congressman to speak at the Serbian festival of Vidov-dan Letter re. Tito's Yugoslavia policy towards the West 5 6.7 1955 January 13 Letter K. Fotic to Henry Leverich of the State Department about Tito's policy towards the West Letter from K. Fotic to Charles De Gaulle 6 78 1958 June 8 Letter from K. Fotic to Charles De Gaulle re. congratulating De Gaulle on being appointed President of the Council of Ministers and reminding De Gaulle of the friendship he had with General Mihajlovitch